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Independent Orbiter Assessment
Assessment of the Landing/Deceleration FMEA/CIL
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions
for Preparation of FMEA and CIL, I0 October 1986.
The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Landing /
Deceleration (LDG/DEC) hardware, generating draft failure modes
and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this
analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results
contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA
results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with
proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each
discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional
analysis as required. This report documents the results of that
comparison for the Orbiter LDG/DEC hardware.
The. IOA product for the LDG/DEC analysis consisted of 259 failure
mode "worksheets" that resulted in 124 potential critical items
being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline (as
of 19 November 1986) which consisted of 267 FMEA's and 120 CIL
items. The comparison determined if there were any results which
had been found by the IOA but were not in the NASA baseline.
This comparison produced agreement on all but 75 FMEA's which
caused differences in 51 CIL items. Figure 1 presents a
comparison of the proposed Post 51-L NASA baseline, with the IOA
recommended baseline, and any issues.
The issues arose due to differences between the NASA and IOA
FMEA/CIL preparation instructions. NASA had used an older ground
rules document which has since been superseded by the NSTS 22206
used by the IOA. After comparison, there were no discrepancies
found that were not already identified by NASA, and the remaining
issues may be attributed to differences in ground rules.
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Figure 1 - LDG/DEC FMEA/CIL ASSESSMENT
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
2 •1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has
undertaken the task of re-evaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessment
of the proposed Post 51-L Orbiter FMEA/CIL for completeness and
technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the proposed Post 51-L NASA and Prime
Contractor FMEA/CIL. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL which is
documented in this report.
Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
i.i Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 Ground Rules and Assumptions
The ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are defined in
Appendix B. The subsystem specific ground rules were defined
to limit the analysis to single-failed parts for each failure.
3.0 SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Function
The Landing / Deceleration Subsystem consists of the hardware
required to perform landing and rollout to a safe stop (Figure
2). In addition, the landing / deceleration system performs the
function of transporting the Orbiter during the landing phase and
towing during post mission operations• The Landing /
Deceleration
Subsystem consists of the following components:
l. The Nose Landing Gear Shock Strut Assembly (NGSSA.) is
the assembly that supports the nose of the Orbiter
during landing and ground handling operations. The
NGSSA consists of the Shock Strut, Axle, Steering /
Damping Actuator, Torque Arms, Drag Brace, Lock Brace,
and attaching hardware (Figures 3 & 4).
. The Nose Landing Gear Doors and Uplock / Release
Mechanisms (Figures 3 & 4) consists of the following
components that function when the landing gear deploy
switch is activated:
o Extend / Retract Hydraulic Strut Actuator
o Door Extend Retract Mechanism
o Door Over-Center Bungee
o Gear Uplock Hook
o Door Hooks
o Door Hook Actuation Linkage
o NLG Uplock Release Hydraulic Actuator
o Backup Pyro Uplock Release Actuator
o NLG Extension Booster Pyro Actuator
o Door Bungee Assist Assembly
3. The data for the Nose Landing Gear Wheels and Tires are
not currently available for use in the evaluation of
the wheels or the tires. B. F. Goodrich drawings were
requested through NASA, Rockwell International - Downey
Operations, and through B. F. Goodrich - in Troy, Ohio.
Some analysis has been performed using the Rockwell
Procurement Specifications which were available through
NASA.
• The two Main Landing Gear Shock Strut Assemblies
(MGSSA) support the aft portion of the Orbiter during
landing and ground handling activities. The MGSSA
consists of the Shock Strut, Axle, Torque Arms, Drag
Brace, Lock Brace, and attaching hardware
(Figures 5 & 6).
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The Main Landing Gear Doors and Uplock Mechanisms
(Figures 5 & 6) consists of the following components
that function when the landing gear deploy switch is
activated:
o Extend / Retract Hydraulic Strut Actuator
o Door Extend Retract Mechanism
o Door Over-Center Bungee
o Gear Uplock Hook
o Door Hooks
o Door Hook Actuation Linkage
o MLG Uplock Release Hydraulic Actuator
o Backup Pyro Uplock Release Actuator
o Door Bungee Assist Mechanism
The data for the Main Landing Gear Wheels and Tires are
not currently available for use in the evaluation of
the wheels or the tires. B. F. Goodrich drawings were
requested through NASA, Rockwell International - Downey
Operations, and through B. F. Goodrich - in Troy, Ohio.
Some analysis has been performed using the Rockwell
Procurement Specifications which were available through
NASA.
The data for the Brake and Anti-Skid Controls are
limited and the assessment was performed using the data
available in the Space Shuttle Systems Handbook, the
Shuttle Flight Operations Manual - Volume 10D, the
Rockwell Procurement Specification, Brake / Skid
Control Subsystem, Wheel Brakes - Main Landing Gear,
Orbiter, and the NASA Training Document on Landing /
Deceleration systems, LNDG/DECEL 2102. Data were
requested on the Mark III Skid Control System, but we
were informed that the data were proprietary and that
the data would not be made available for the assess-
ment. Current data were requested through NASA and
Rockwell International - Downey Operations. The Brake
and Anti-Skid Controls consist of the Rudder / Brake
Pedal Assembly and the Brake / Skid Control System as
identified in Figure 7.
The data for the Brake System are not currently
available for use in the evaluation of the system•
B. F. Goodrich drawings were requested through NASA,
Rockwell International - Downey Operations, and through
B. F. Goodrich - in Troy, Ohio. Some analysis has been
performed using the Rockwell Procurement Specifications
which were available through NASA. Some data were
found on the Orbiter braking system through Lockheed,
in Clear Lake through the notes from the AD HOC
COMMITTEE - ORBITER BRAKING SYSTEM ASSESSMENT
documents. The brake system consists of four electro-
hydraulic disc braking systems. Each assembly has nine
discs: four rotors and five stators. The rotors are
•i0.
ii.
splined to the inside of the wheel and they rotate with
the wheel. The stators are splined to the outside of
the axle assembly and they do not rotate• When the
brakes are applied, eight hydraulic actuators in the
brake assembly press the discs together, thus provid
ing the braking torque. The hydraulic brake actuators
are distributed evenly around the discs, four of the
actuators are manifolded into a brake chamber and are
powered by a single hydraulic system The remaining
four are manifolded into a second braking chamber and
are powered by a different hydraulic system.
The Rudder / Brake Pedal Assembly is the mechanical
assembly that allows the crew to make manual inputs
into the Landing / Deceleration Subsystems• The R/BPA
converts the manual inputs into electrical data that is
transmitted to the flight control systems, the brake
controls and the nose wheel steering. Each rudder /
brake pedal assembly contains two brake pedal
transducer units called the Rudder Pedal Transducer
Assemblies (RPTA). Each unit has four Linear Variable
Differential Transducers (LVDT) which output 0-5 VDC
brake signals to the brake / skid control boxes A and
B. Each of the transducer units output four separate
braking signals for the respective left / right brake
control for the associated braking system.
The Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD&C)
consists of two subsystems within the Landing /
Deceleration Subsystem: Landing Gear Control and Brake
and Antiskid. The Landing Gear Control system provides
power to the Nose and Main Landing Gear Doors and
Uplock Release Mechanisms on the orbiter (Figure 8).
The Brake and Antiskid subsystem transfers brake and
skid control power to the Brake/Skid Control Boxes A
and B (Figure 7). Power is also provided to the
hydraulic brake-line heater coils for orbiter hydraulic
fluid heating. EPD&C powers the electronics for
sensing and monitoring the discrete position of moving
parts and assemblies within the Landing / Deceleration
subsystem•
The responsibility for the Nose Wheel Steering system
has been assigned to the NWS Group• The FMEA's for the
NWS were originally included in the Landing / Decelera-
tion Subsystem. The mechanical linkage portions of the
NWS are still included in the Landing / Deceleration
IOA reports as a portion of the Nose Landing Gear
reports.
12. The Hydraulics Actuators on the Landing / Deceleration
Subsystem consists of six actuators. Three actuators
activate the mechanism to release the uplock mechanism
to deploy the landing gear mechanisms, and three actua-
tors perform the task of extending or retracting the
landing gear. Landing gear retraction can only be
performed while the vehicle is being supported by
Ground Support Equipment (GSE), a landing gear
retraction cannot be supported on orbit. These
actuators are actually components of the subsystems
listed in sections 2 and 5 of this paragraph. However,
for this report they are broken out separately for the
purpose of clarity.
3.2 Interfaces and Locations
The Landing / Deceleration hardware consists of six major
subcomponents located in the Orbiter's cabin area and on the
under carriage of the Orbiter. The interfaces for the subsystem
are relatively simple in that there is a limited number of inter
faces with the other subsystems on the Orbiter. The interfaces
with the other subsystems are basically limited to interfaces
with the Data Processing System (DPS) for backup flight control
purposes (NWS) and for instrumentation on the Landing / Decelera-
tion hardware, and the Hydraulics System (HYD) for hydraulics
system pressure for the subsystem actuators and for the brakes.
The remainder of the subsystem is capable of direct control, via
wire, from the control device to the subsystem hardware.
3.3 Hierarchy
Figure 2 illustrates the hierarchy of the Landing / Deceleration
Subsystem hardware and the corresponding subcomponents. Figures
3 through 8 comprise the detailed system representations.
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Figure 2 - LDG/DEC SUBSYSTEM OVERVIEW
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Figure 3 - NOSE LANDING GEAR - STOWED POSITION
I0
//
///
/ /
//
/
/
Figure 4 - NOSE LANDING GEAR - EXTENDED POSITION
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Figure 5 - MAIN LANDING GEAR - STOWED POSITION
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/Figure 6 - MAIN LANDING GEAR - EXTENDED POSITION
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Figure 7 - BRAKE / SKID CONTROL SYSTEM OVERVIEW
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Figure 8 - LANDING GEAR CONTROL SYSTEM OVERVIEW
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4.0 ASSESSMENT RESULTS
The IOA analysis of the Landing / Deceleration hardware initially '
generated 256 failure mode worksheets and identified 124
Potential Critical Items (PCIs) before starting the assessment
process. The IOA supported the first NASA sponsored Landing /
Deceleration hardware working group meeting on 20-24 January
1987. During the meeting a great deal of work was done to
support the development of the OMRSD data and to support the
tracking of the OMRSD data with the FMEA/CIL data. Meeting
minutes and reports were requested during the meeting, but no
minutes or reports were received by the IOA for an analysis.
During May 1987, the IOA personnel went directly to the Subsystem
Manager, and subsequently to his supervisor in order to have data
released. Rough data was obtained and the data that the IOA
personnel received was stamped as preliminary data and verbal
instructions were given that the data not be used for a
comparison of FMEA/CIL documentation. Additional attempts to
obtain hardware data were unsuccessful, success was achieved in
obtaining preliminary EPD&C in October 1987. The hardware
portion of the NASA analysis was not completed until January
1988, there was insufficient time available to perform an
analysis and prepare a comparison of the results.
In the analysis report, the Landing / Deceleration Subsystem was
divided into six separate functional areas according to hardware
and function. Difficulty was encountered in the hardware
analysis due to the large amounts of proprietary data or
unobtainable data on the brakes and skid control hardware, the
tires and wheels, and many of the mechanisms of the landing gear
and the hydraulics systems. The initial NASA document, STS 82-
0013, consisted of five separate functional areas which included
one hundred eighteen (118) FMEA/CIL's. After the initial
definition of the subsystem the thirty two (32) NWS FMEA's were
removed and a separate group was initiated to prepare the
analysis for that subsystem. A decision was made to include the
EPD&C data for the subsystem and one hundred twenty two (122)
Electrical FMEA's were added to the subsystem. In November 1986
forty four (44) Hydraulics FMEA's were added to the subsystem.
After the initial IOA Analasys was completed in January 1987, a
decision was made to remove the pyrotechnic devices from the
subsystem, which removed six FMEA's from the NLG and MLG
subsystems. The seven areas of the Landing / Deceleration
analysis that have been encompassed in this report and there
status are as follows:
BRAKES AND ANTI-SKID (B&AS)
Forty two (42) FMEA's on the Brakes and Anti-Skid were
included in the original data package. The study of the
Anti-Skid system was accomplished utilizing data that was
available through NASA. Difficulty was encountered in the
preparation of the data on the actual brake hardware and the
wheels and tires, for there was no data available through
NASA to study or review, a large amount of the data involved
16
is proprietary. Data on the brakes and tires is controlled
by B.F. Goodrich, and the data on the antiskid subsystem is
maintained by Crane Industries. An analysis on the Brakes,
Wheels and Tires was not fully accomplished due to the lack
of data available.
ELECTRICAL POWERDISTRIBUTION AND CONTROL(EPD&C)
EPD&Cprovides power to the Landing Gear Control Subsystem,
Brake and Anti-Skid subsystem, and to the sensing and
monitoring functions within the Landing / Deceleration
Subsystem. The IOA Analysis generated 114 assessment
worksheets associated with credible failure modes and
defined criticality. Of the identified failure modes eleven
(Ii) are criticality 2/IR, forty-six (46)are criticality
3/IR, and fifty seven (57) are criticality 3/3. Thirty one
(31) failure modes are identified as PCI's. These PCI's are
listed in Appendix D. The assessment between the IOA EPD&C
worksheets and NASA Post 51-L FMEA/CIL (PRCB Review
Presentation 1/25/88) Produced forty (40) issues. IOA
recommends downgrading the criticality of nine (9) FMEA's,
three (3) of which will be removed from the CIL. IOA
recommends that fifteen (15) of the NASA baseline FMEA's be
deleted because they represent non-credible failure modes
for those particular components. These deletions would
remove seven (7) items from the CIL. IOA recommends changes
in the redundancy screens for six (6) NASA FMEA's.
Resulting in two new additional CIL's. IOA also recommends
the addition of fifteen (15) FMEA's to the NASA baseline for
failure modes not present in the NASA baseline. One (i) of
the additions will require a new CIL. IOA generated one (i)
new analysis sheet to correspond to a NASA baseline FMEA not
covered in the original IOA analysis. The IOA analysis
agreed with the NASA failure mode and criticality
evaluation.
FLIGHT CONTROLS
Originally, only one (I) FMEA was written on the flight
controls and that was written against the Pedal Assembly.
HYDRAULICS (HYD)
Originally, no Hydraulics FMEAs were included in the Landing
/ Deceleration subsystem. Forty-four (44) FMEA's from the
Hydraulics system were added to the subsystem in order to
conform with the NASA configuration. The information about
the addition of the Hydraulics data was transmitted to the
IOA Subsystem manager in late November 1986 just prior to
the initial submission of the data to the IOA Data
Management Group. The Landing / Deceleration subsystem
assumed responsibility for the actuators and the hydraulic
17
lines from the point where the hydraulic lines entered the
landing gear compartment.
MAIN LANDING GEAR (MLG)
Twenty five (25) FMEA's were written against the MLG. Two
(2) Pyrotechnic FMEA's were removed from this system after
the IOA analysis was completed, these analysis have remained
in this report.
NOSE LANDING GEAR (NLG)
Nineteen (19) FMEA's were written against the NLG. Four (4)
Pyrotechnic FMEA's were removed from this system after the
IOA analysis was completed, these analysis have remained in
this report.
NOSEWHEELSTEERING (NWS)
Thirty two (32) FMEA's on the NWSwere originally included
in the Landing / Deceleration subsystem, these FMEA's were
transfered to the NWS analysis group in order to align with
the NASA configuration.
The following Pyrotechnic (PYRO) data was covered by the initial
Independent Orbiter Assessment, and the data has been included in
the initial assessment report. The data is not covered in the
NASA Landing / Deceleration report.
FMEA NUMBER
02-1-015-1
02-1-015-2
02-1-097-1
02-1-097-2
02-1-104-1
02-1-104-2
IOA ASSESSMENT NUMBER
11102
iii01
21101
21102
11202
11201
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The data required to perform an analysis was not available for
the following FMEA's, so no analysis was performed rather than
preparing data with no documentation to support a position.
FMEANUMBER
02-1-011-1
02-1-031-1
02-1-056-1
02-1-066-1
02-1-067-1
02-1-068-1
02-1-068-2
02-1-068-3
02-1-069-1
02-1-070-1
02-1-071-1
02-1-071-2
02-1-105-1
02-1-110-2
CLAMP FLEX LINE BRAKES
DISPLACEMENT LIMITER
THERMAL RELIEF PLUG MLG
WHEEL BRAKE ASSEMBLY
WHEEL TIE BOLTS, MLG
WHEEL ASSEMBLY, MLG
WHEEL ASSEMBLY, MLG
WHEEL ASSEMBLY, MLG
WHEEL ASSEMBLY OVERINFLATION PLUG MLG
WHEEL TIE BOLTS - NLG
WHEEL - NLG
WHEEL - NLG
NLG THERMAL RELIEF PLUG
NLG TIRES
The following Nose Wheel Steering (NWS) data were removed from
the Landing / Deceleration Subsystem responsibility in order to
align with the activities at NASA. A separate IOA team evaluated
the NWS data.
02-1-084-1
02-1-086-i
02-1-086-2
02-1-087-1
02-1-087-2
02-1-088-1
02-1-088-2
02-1-089-1
02-1-089-2
02-1-089-3
02-1-090-1
02-1-090-2
02-1-091-1
02-1-091-2
02-1-092-1
02-1-092-2
02-1-093-1
02-1-093-2
02-1-094-1
02-1-094-2
02-1-095-1
02-1-096-1
02-1-096-2
02-1-100-1
02-1-100-2 CIL ONLY
02-1-101-1 CIL ONLY
02-1-101-2 CIL ONLY
02-1-106-2 CIL ONLY
02-I-SPA-I
02-I-SPA-2
02-I-SPT-I
02-I-SPT-2
The IOA analysis of the LDG/DEC hardware generated 259 failure
mode worksheets and identified 124 Potential Critical Items
(PCI's). These analysis results were compared to the proposed
NASA Post 51-L baseline of 267 FMEA's including 120 CIL
items,which were generated using the NSTS 22206 FMEA/CIL
instructions. Upon completion of the assessment, there were 75
issues with 51 pertaining to CIL items.
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A summary of the quantity of NASA FMEAs assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented
in Table I.
I Table I SUMMARYOF IOA FMEAASSESSMENT I
Component
B&AS
EPD&C
Flight Controls
HYD
MLG
NLG
PYRO
NASA
28
135
1
IOA
28
122
3
I TOTAL
+
42
40
15
6
267
40
29
31
6
259
Issues
9
40
m
2
ii
13
75
FMEA count inlcudes CIL's
A summary of the quantity of NASA CIL items assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented
in Table II.
I Table II SUMMARY OF IOA CIL ASSESSMENT I
+
I Component NASA IOA Issues
+
B&AS
EPD&C
Flight Controls
15
44
1
14
38
2
HYD
MLG
NLG
PYRO
i0
33
ii
6
16
23
25
6
9
16
2
ii
13
TOTAL 120 124 51
Appendix C presents the detailed assessment worksheets for each
failure mode identified and assessed. Appendix D highlights the
NASA Critical Items and corresponding IOA worksheet ID. Appendix
E contains IOA analysis worksheets supplementing previous
analysis results reported in Space Transportation System
Engineering and Operations Support (STSEOS) Working Paper No.
Io0-WP-VA86001-25, Analysis of the Landing/Deceleration Subsystem
(19 January 1987). Appendix F provides a cross reference between
the NASA FMEA and corresponding IOA worksheet(s). IOA
recommendations are also summarized.
2O
Table III presents a summary of the IOA recommended failure
criticalities for the Post 51-L FMEA baseline. Further
discussion of each of these subdivisions and the applicable
failure modes is provided in subsequent paragraphs.
Table III
Criticality:
SUMMARY OF IOA RECOMMENDED FAILURE CRITICALITIES I
...... 4 _-.....
i/1 2/IR 2/2 3/2R 3/3
B&AS
EPD&C
Flight Cntrls
HYD
MLG
NLG
PYRO
TOTAL
5
2
6
22
23
6
64 I
m
11 -
i I
10 -
_ u
28 -
3/IR
9
52
1
2
m
n
m
7
59
1
24
6
6
0
103
TOTAL
28
122
3
40
29
31
6
259 I
i,.__- I.
FMEA count includes CIL's
Of the failure modes analyzed, 124 were determined to be critical
items. A summary of the IOA recommended critical items is
presented in Table IV.
Table IV SUMMARY OF IOA RECOMMENDED FAILURE CRITICALITIES
Criticality:
B&AS
EPD&C
Flight Cntrls
HYD
MLG
NLG
PYRO
TOTAL
i/1
5
2
6
22
23
6
64
-2/IR
7
ii
I0
28
2/2 3/IR
2
27
1
2
3/2R 3/3 TOTAL
14
38
2
16
23
25
6
- 32 - - 124
21
The scheme for assigning IOA assessment (Appendix C) and analysis
(Appendix E) worksheet numbers is shown in Table V.
I
Component
B&AS
EPD&C
Flight Controls
HYD
MLG
NLG
PYRO
Table V IOA WORKSHEET NUMBERS
IOA ID Number
LDGDEC - 30000
LDGDEC - 31000
LDGDEC - 30000
LDGDEC - i0000, II000, 20000, 21000
LDGDEC - 20000, 21000
LDGDEC - i0000, II000
LDGDEC - ii000, 21000
22
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Assembly, Main Landing Gear - Gear Uplock Release,
6 June 1986.
ii. MC621-0011 Rockwell Procurement Specification, Shock Strut
Assembly - Main Landing Gear - Orbiter, 8 July 1985.
12. MC621-0012 Rockwell Procurement Specification, Shock Strut
Assembly - Nose Landing Gear - Orbiter, 7 May 1981.
13. MC621-0043 Rockwell Procurement Specification, Space
Shuttle Flight Control Subsystem, 4 October 1985.
14. MC621-0050 Rockwell Procurement Specification, Wheel
Assembly, Nose Landing Gear - Orbiter, 30 March 1984.
15. MC621-0051 Rockwell Procurement Specification, Wheel and
Brake Assembly - Main Landing Gear - Orbiter,
21 February 1986.
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16. MC621-0055 Rockwell Procurement Specification, Brake / Skid
Control Subsystem, Wheel Brakes - Main Landing Gear -
Orbiter, 13 January 1986.
17. MC621-0058 Rockwell Procurement Specification, Steering
and Damping Subsystem - Nose Landing Gear, 24 October 1985.
18. VO70-510001 Main Landing Gear - Installation. Revision
B-13, 28 July 1986.
19. VO70-510101 Booster Assembly, Door Extension - Main Landing
Gear. Revision B-08, i0 December 1985.
20. VO70-510201 Mechanical Installation - Main Landing Gear.
Revision D-IO, 8 July 1986.
21. VO70-510202 Assembly of the Uplock Arm - Main Landing Gear.
Revision ?, i0 September 1974.
22. VO70-510300 Fitting Installation - Main Landing Gear.
Revision C-05, 1 March 1984.
23. VO70-510301 Uplock Assembly - Main Landing Gear. Revision
C-10, 30 November 1984.
24. VO70-510302 Fitting, Uplock, Assembly of, Main Landing
Gear. Revision C-06, 20 September 1985.
25. VO70-510346 Hook, Center Door - Assembly of, Main Landing
Gear. Revision B, i August 1978.
26. VO70-510400 Hook - Door, Assembly of, Main Landing Gear.
Revision ?, 5 November 1980.
27. VO70-510476 Fitting, Inboard Trunnion, Assembly of, Main
Landing gear. Revision ?, 26 April 1986.
28. VO70-510501 Installation - Nose Landing Gear. Revision
C-05, 30 July 1986.
29. VO70-510502 Chassis Assembly - Nose Landing Gear. Revision
E-09, 29 July 1986.
30. VO70-510550 Uplock Assembly - Nose Landing Gear. Revision
B-10, 7 November 1985.
31. VO70-510601 Doors and Mechanical Installation - Nose
Landing Gear. Revision E-24, 19 February 1985.
32. VO70-510711 Lock Assembly - Aft Door, Nose Landing Gear.
Revision A-03, 9 February 1978.
33. VO70-510751 Bungee Assembly - Thruster, Nose Landing Gear.
Revision B-05, 12 February 1982.
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34. VO70-552001 Cartridge Installation - Nose Landing Gear
Thrusters.
35. VO70-573001 Mechanical Installation - Yaw & Brake Control
Pedals. Revision C-II, 25 October 1985.
36. VS70-510109 Schematic Diagram - Landing Gear Control
Subsystem. Revision E-01, 6 June 1983.
37. VS70-510209 Schematic Diagram - Nose Wheel Steering
Subsystem. Revision F-01, 23 August 1985.
38. VS70-520109 Schematic Diagram - Brake and Skid Control
Subsystem. Revision E-01, 22 August 1985.
39. VS70-790149 Schematic Diagram - Rudder Pedal Transducer
Assembly - Flight Control Subsystem. Revision ?, 1 December
1984.
40. 1170100 MENASCO - Shock Strut Assembly - Main Landing Gear -
Orbiter. Revision 2-H, Date Unreadable.
41. 1170101 MENASCO - Cylinder Assembly, Shock Strut _ Main
Landing Gear - Orbiter. Revision D, Date Unreadable.
42. 1170114 MENASCO - Pin Meetering, Shock Strut - Main Landing
Gear - Orbiter. Revision C, Date Unreadable.
43. 1170182 MENASCO - Axle Assembly, Shock Strut - Main Landing
Gear - Orbiter. Revision A. 7 November 1984. (Reference
Only)
44. 1170300 MENASCO - Drag Brace Assembly - Main Landing Gear -
Orbiter. Revision D, Date Unreadable.
45. 1170301 MENASCO - Drag Brace Assembly - Lower - Main Landing
Gear - Orbiter. Revision A, Date Unreadable.
46. 1170350 MENASCO - Lock Brace Assembly - Main Landing Gear -
Orbiter. Revision E, 20 July 1976.
47. 1170493 MENASCO - Layout - Shock Strut - Main Landing Gear -
Orbiter. Revision F, Date Unreadable.
48. Landing / Deceleration - LDG/DECEL 2102 - Training Document.
22-02-83
49. MC287-0034 Rockwell Procurement Specification, Actuator
Strut, Landing Gear, Hydraulic. Revision H-6, 1 August 1983.
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APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS
AOA
ATO
B&AS
BFC
BFS
BITE
C&W
CIL
CPU
CRT
D/A
DPS
EPD&C
EVA
FMEA
GFE
GPC
GSE
HDC
HYD
IOA
LCA
LDG/DEC
LVDT
MDAC
MGSSA
MLG
NA
NASA
NGSSA
NLG
NO
NSTS
NWS
OMRSD
OPS
PCA
PCI
PIC
PYRO
R/BPA
REG
RI
RPTA
RTLS
- Abort-Once-Around
- Abort-To-Orbit
- Brakes and Antiskid
- Backup Flight Control
- Backup Flight System
- Built-In Test Equipment
- Caution and Warning
- Critical Items List
- Central Processing Unit
- Cathode-Ray Tube
- Digital to Analog
- Data Processing System (Subsystem)
- Electrical Power Distribution and Control
- Extravehicular Activity
- Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
- Government Furnished Equipment
- General Purpose Computer
- Ground Support Equipment
- Hybrid Driver Controller
- Hydraulics
- Independent Orbiter Assessment
- Load Controller Assembly
- Landing/Deceleration
- Linear Variable Differential Transformer
- McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
- Main Gear Shock Strut Assembly
- Main Landing Gear
- Not Applicable
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- Nose Landing Gear Shock Strut Assembly
- Nose Landing Gear
- Number
- National Space Transportation System
- Nose-Wheel Steering
- Operational Maintenance Requirements and
Specifications Document
- Operations Sequence
- Power Control Assembly
- Potential Critical Item
- Pyro Initiator Controller
- Pyrotechnic
- Rudder/Pedal Brake Assembly
- Regulate, Regulator
- Rockwell International
- Rudder Pedal Transducer Assembly
- Return-to-Landing Site
A-I
ACRONYMS
SFTWE
STS
STSEOS
TAL
TD
THC
VAC
VDC
WONG
WOW
- Software
- Space Transportation System
- Space Transportation System Engineering
and Operations Support
- Transatlantic Abort Landing
- Touch Down
- Thruster Hand Controller
- Volts, ac
- Volts, dc
- Weight on Nose Gear
- Weight on Wheels
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DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I
B.2
B.3
Definitions
Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
Subsystem-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
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DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL. I0 October 1986, were used with the following
amplifications and additions.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TA__LL- begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW pROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
planned end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(ops)
M C - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
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MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINA_ CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OP__SS- software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ends with the completion of post-landing
safing operations
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B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA/CIL, i0 October 1986, was employed with the
following amplifications and additions•
i.
•
•
•
.
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown•
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings•
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
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.
,
i0.
ii.
All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CIL's, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEA's assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
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B.3 LDG/DEC-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
The IOA analysis was performed to the component or assembly level
of the Landing and Deceleration (LDG/DEC) Subsystem. The analysis
considered the worst case effects of the hardware or functional
failure on tMe subsystem, mission, and crew and vehicle safety.
l. Pyrotechnic devices were not considered as emergency
devices that were to be used in contingency operations.
The Pyrotechnic devices were evaluated according to the
usage or the demand for usage, if the devices were
demanded and they failed to perform. (Pyrotechnic
devices were removed from the NASA Analysis after the
completion of the IOA Assessment).
RATIONALE:The NLG extension Booster Pyro Actuator
functions every time that the NLG is operated
to insure that the system is able to overcome
any wind forces that are acting on the
landing gear doors.
RATIONALE:The Backup Pyro Uplock Release Actuator is a
backup or redundant actuator that operates
two seconds after the deploy command is
issued, if it does not receive a signal that
the Uplock Release Hook has functioned
properly.
. The Landing / Deceleration Subsystem considers that all
NORMAL and INTACT ABORT LANDINGS will be initiated
during the Deorbit Phase and terminated post landing at
the time of vehicle egress.
RATIONALE:Under the IOA specific rules all landings
will fall under two phase definitions, the
deorbit Phase and the Landing/Safing Phase.
The intent of this rule is to simplify the
development of the analysis by not requiring
an analysis for both operational phases.
, Component age life will not be considered in the
analysis.
RATIONALE:Component age analysis is beyond the scope of
this task.
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DETAILED ASBESSHENT
This section contains the IOA assessment worksheets generated
during the assessment of this subsystem. The information on
these worksheets facilitates the comparison of the NASA FMEA/CIL
(Pre and Post 51-L) to the IOA detailed analysis worksheets
included in Appendix E. Each of these worksheets identifies the
NASA FMEA being assessed, corresponding MDAC Analysis Worksheet
ID (Appendix E), hardware item, criticality, redundancy screens,
and recommendations. For each failure mode, the highest assessed
hardware and functional criticality is compared and discrepancies
noted as "N" in the compare row under the column where the
discrepancy occurred.
LEGEND FOR IOA ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission
Redundancy Screens A, B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
NASA Data :
Baseline
New
= NASA FMEA/CIL
= Baseline with Proposed Post 51-L Changes
CIL Item :
X = Included in CIL
Compare Row :
N = Non compare for that column (deviation)
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-20201
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
20201
SHOCKSTRUT STRUCTURE
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THE NASA FMEA/CIL ONLY COVERS THE SHOCK STRUT PISTON INNER
AND OUTER CYLINDER AND NOT THE REMAINING STRUCTURE OF THE MLGSSA
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-2
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-20202
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-001-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20202
SHOCK STRUT PISTON ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE NASA FMEA COVERS ONLY THE LOSS OF NITROGEN.
[ ]
[x]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-20203
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-001-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20203
SHOCK STRUT PISTON ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
- NASA FMEA ASSUMES LOSS OF NITROGEN ELASTIC MEDIUM ONLY.
- HYD FLUID IS CONSIDERED AS CAPABLE OF ABSORBING A LANDING
SHOCK PER MC621-0011.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
LDGDEC-20101
02-1-002-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20101
TIRES, MLG TYPE I
W. WEISSINGER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-20206
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-003-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20206
LOWER DRAG BRACE STRUT
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
ALSO SEE 20219.
[x]
[ ]
- NASA FMEA CONSIDERS ONLY THE ASSEMBLY AND DOES NOT CONSIDER
THE INDIVIDUAL CRITICAL PARTS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
LDGDEC-20207
02-1-003-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20207
UPPER DRAG BRACE TRUNIONS (2 EA)
W. WEISSINGER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ 1/1
(If different from NASA)
] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
ALSO SEE 20219.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
- NASA FMEA CONSIDERS ONLY THE ASSEMBLY AND DOES NOT CONSIDER
THE INDIVIDUAL CRITICAL PARTS.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-20219
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-003-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
20219
UPPER DRAGBRACESTRUTS (2 EA)
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
SEE 20206, 20220, 20221 & 20223.
[ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
- NASA FMEA 02-1-003-1 DEALS WITH THE DRAG BRACE ASSEMBLY AS A
SINGLE PART. THE ASSEMBLY CONSISTS OF SEVERAL COMPONENTS MOST OF
WHICH ARE CRITICAL.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
LDGDEC-20220
02-1-003-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20220
CENTER DRAG BRACE TRUNION (AT LOCK BRACE)
W. WEISSINGER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
SEE 20219 & 20221.
CAi
(ADD DELETE)
[ ]
[x]
- NASA FMEA 02-1-003-1 DEALS WITH THE DRAG BRACE ASSEMBLY AS A
SINGLE PART. THE ASSEMBLY CONSISTS OF SEVERAL COMPONENTS MOST OF
WHICH ARE CRITICAL.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-20221
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-003-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
STRUT)
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20221
LOWER DRAG BRACE TRUNION (ATTACHES TO SHOCK
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS :
[ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
- NASA FMEA 02-i-003-1 DEALS WITH THE DRAG BRACE ASSEMBLY AS A
SINGLE PART. THE ASSEMBLY CONSISTS OF SEVERAL COMPONENTS MOST OF
WHICH ARE CRITICAL.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-20204
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-004-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20204
TORQUE ARM ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[x]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-20208
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-005-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20208
LOCK BRACE ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS :
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-20222
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-005-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20222
LOCK BRACE CENTER TRUNION
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA CONSIDERS THE ASSEMBLY AS A COMPONENT NOT AS THE (5)
FIVE SINGLE POINT FAILURES THAT COULD OCCUR DUE TO THE THREE
TRUNIONS AND THE TWO ARMS.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-13
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-20216
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-006-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20216
UPLOCK ROLLER RETAINING ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[x]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-14
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-20211
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-007-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20211
MLG DOWN AND LOCK SENSORS
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
ALSO SEE 20212.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-15
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-20209
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-008-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
20209
DOWNLOCK BUNGEE
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i" ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UNTIL THE SAFETY PIN IS INSTALLED IN THE LOCK BRACE THERE IS
A MAJOR PROBLEM. FROM THE TIME THE HYD SYS 1 IS SHUTDOWN UNTIL
THE SAFETY IS INSTALLED THERE IS AN IMINENT THREAT OF COLLAPSE.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-16
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
LDGDEC-20210
02-1-008-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20210
DOWN LOCK BUNGEE
W. WEISSINGER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[P]
[ NA]
[N]
B
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
C
[ P ]
[ NA]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
SEE IOA EFFECTS/RATIONALE.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-17
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-20212
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-009-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20212
MLG DOWN AND LOCK SENSORS
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT'.
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
H DW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-18
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-20213
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-009-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
20213
MLG DOWNAND LOCK SENSORS
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 _3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
ClL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-19
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-20217
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-010-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20217
TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-20
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-20501
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-012-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
20501
DOOREXTEND/ RETRACT MECH
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ASSEMBLY WAS CALLED OUT BY NAME ON THE DRAWING. THE
NASA FMEA'S CALL OUT THE VARIOUS RODS, FITTINGS, HOOKS AND TUBES
WHICH MAKE UP OUR ASSEMBLIES.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-21
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-20701
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-012-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20701
MLG UPLOCK HOOK ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ASSEMBLY WAS CALLED OUT BY NAME ON THE DRAWING.
THE NASA FMEA'S CALL OUT THE VARIOUS RODS, FITTINGS, HOOKS
AND TUBES WHICH MAKEUP OUR ASSEMBLIES.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-22
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-20901
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-012-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
20901
DOORHOOKACTUATUONLINKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
THIS ASSEMBLY WAS CALLED OUT BY NAME ON THE DRAWING.
THE NASA FMEA'S CALL OUT THE VARIOUS RODS, FITTINGS, HOOKS
AND TUBES WHICH MAKEUP OUR ASSEMBLIES.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-23
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-20501A
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-013-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM'.
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20501
DOOR EXTEND / RETRACT MECH
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ASSEMBLY WAS CALLED OUT BY NAME ON THE DRAWING. THE
NASA FMEA'S CALL OUT THE VARIOUS RODS, FITTINGS, HOOKS AND TUBES
WHICH MAKE UP OUR ASSEMBLIES.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-24
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-20701A
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-013-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
20701
MLG UPLOCKHOOKASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS_
THIS ASSEMBLY WAS CALLED OUT BY NAME ON THE DRAWING.
THE NASA FMEA'S CALL OUT THE VARIOUS RODS, FITTINGS, HOOKS
AND TUBES WHICH MAKEUP OUR ASSEMBLIES.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-25
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-20901A
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-013-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20901
DOOR HOOK ACTUATUON LINKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
c / ] c ] c ] c ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ASSEMBLY WAS CALLED OUT BY NAME ON THE DRAWING.
THE NASA FMEA'S CALL OUT THE VARIOUS RODS, FITTINGS, HOOKS
AND TUBES WHICH MAKEUP OUR ASSEMBLIES.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-26
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-205OIB
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-014-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20501
DOOR EXTEND / RETRACT MECH
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:-
THIS ASSEMBLY WAS CALLED OUT BY NAME ON THE DRAWING. THE
NASA FMEA'S CALL OUT THE VARIOUS RODS, FITTINGS, HOOKS AND TUBES
WHICH MAKE UP OUR ASSEMBLIES.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-27
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-20701B
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-014-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20701
MLG UPLOCK HOOK ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ASSEMBLY WAS CALLED OUT BY NAME ON THE DRAWING.
THE NASA FMEA'S CALL OUT THE VARIOUS RODS, FITTINGS, HOOKS
AND TUBES WHICH MAKEUP OUR ASSEMBLIES.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-28
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-20901B
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-014-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
209O1
DOOR HOOK ACTUATUON LINKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ASSEMBLY WAS CALLED OUT BY NAME ON THE DRAWING.
THE NASA FMEA'S CALL OUT THE VARIOUS RODS, FITTINGS, HOOKS
AND TUBES WHICH MAKEUP OUR ASSEMBLIES.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-29
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-21101
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-015-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
21101
MLG PYRO UPLOCK RELEASE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-30
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-21102
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-015-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
21102
MLG PYRO UPLOCK RELEASE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS SYSTEM IS NEVER CALLED UPON TO FUNCTION UNLESS THERE IS
AN INITIAL HYDRAULICS MECHANICAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION THAT
INITIATES THE PYRO BACKUP.
ACCORDING TO THE REDUNDANCY RULES IN 22206, THIS SYSTEM IS A
2/IR CRITICALITY, BUT A FAILED HYDRAULICS SYSTEM ACTIVATES THIS
SYSTEM. THIS SYSTEMS FAILURE WILL NOT ACTIVATE THE HYDRAULICS.
THERE IS A LINEAR OPERATION HERE THAT WILL NOT ALLOW
REVERSAL OF THE ROLES.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-31
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
LDGDEC-20218 BASELINE [ X ]
02-1-017-1 NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20218
SHOCK STRUT ATTACHING TRUNIONS
LEAD ANALYST : W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS :
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-32
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-20223
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-018-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20223
SUPPORT BEAM
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE SUPPORT BEAM IS THE COMPONENT THAT HOLDS THE TRUNIONS OF
THE DRAG BRACE ASSEMBLY (AT THE ORBITER ATTACHING POINTS) IN
ALIGNMENT. THE SUPPORT BEAM IS A COMPONENT OF THE DRAG BRACE
ASSEMBLY.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-33
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-20501C
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-019-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
20501
DOOREXTEND/ RETRACT MECH
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC a B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ASSEMBLY WAS CALLED OUT BY NAME ON THE DRAWING. THE
NASA FMEA'S CALL OUT THE VARIOUS RODS, FITTINGS, HOOKS AND TUBES
WHICH MAKE UP OUR ASSEMBLIES.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-34
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
LDGDEC-20701C
02-1-019-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20701
MLG UPLOCK HOOK ASSEMBLY
J. COMPTON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
E /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ASSEMBLY WAS CALLED OUT BY NAME ON THE DRAWING.
THE NASA FMEA'S CALL OUT THE VARIOUS RODS, FITTINGS, HOOKS
AND TUBES WHICH MAKEUP OUR ASSEMBLIES.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-35
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-20901C
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-019-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20901
DOOR HOOK ACTUATUON LINKAGE
LEAD ANALYST : J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ASSEMBLY WAS CALLED OUT BY NAME ON THE DRAWING.
THE NASA FMEA'S CALL OUT THE VARIOUS RODS, FITTINGS, HOOKS
AND TUBES WHICH MAKEUP OUR ASSEMBLIES.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-36
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-20501D
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-020-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20501
DOOR EXTEND / RETRACT MECH
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ASSEMBLY WAS CALLED OUT BY NAME ON THE DRAWING. THE
NASA FMEA'S CALL OUT THE VARIOUS RODS, FITTINGS, HOOKS AND TUBES
WHICH MAKE UP OUR ASSEMBLIES.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
LDGDEC-20701D
02-1-020-1
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20701
MLG UPLOCK HOOK ASSEMBLY
J. COMPTON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ASSEMBLY WAS CALLED OUT BY NAME ON THE DRAWING.
THE NASA FMEA'S CALL OUT THE VARIOUS RODS, FITTINGS, HOOKS
AND TUBES WHICH MAKEUP OUR ASSEMBLIES.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-20901D
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-020-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20901
DOOR HOOK ACTUATUON LINKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ HA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ J C ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ASSEMBLY WAS CALLED OUT BY NAME ON THE DRAWING.
THE NASA FMEA'S CALL OUT THE VARIOUS RODS, FITTINGS, HOOKS
AND TUBES WHICH MAKEUP OUR ASSEMBLIES.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-20501E
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-021-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20501
DOOR EXTEND / RETRACT MECH
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ASSEMBLY WAS CALLED OUT BY NAME ON THE DRAWING. THE
NASA FMEA'S CALL OUT THE VARIOUS RODS, FITTINGS, HOOKS AND TUBES
WHICH MAKE UP OUR ASSEMBLIES.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-20701E
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-021-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20701
MLG UPLOCK HOOK ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ASSEMBLY WAS CALLED OUT BY NAME ON THE DRAWING.
THE NASA FMEA'S CALL OUT THE VARIOUS RODS, FITTINGS, HOOKS
AND TUBES WHICH MAKEUP OUR ASSEMBLIES.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-20901E
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-021-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20901
DOOR HOOK ACTUATUON LINKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ASSEMBLY WAS CALLED OUT BY NAME ON THE DRAWING.
THE NASA FMEA'S CALL OUT THE VARIOUS RODS, FITTINGS, HOOKS
AND TUBES WHICH MAKEUP OUR ASSEMBLIES.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-30114
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-022-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
30114
DISPLACEMENT LIMITER, HYD MODULE ASSY
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-30113
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-022-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
30113
DISPLACEMENT LIMITER, HYD MODULE ASSY
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF ONE DISPLACEMENT LIMITER WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ONE
BRAKE LINE. NEXT FAILURE WILL LOSE ANOTHER BRAKE LINE, BUT CREW
SHOULD STILL ROLLOUT SAFELY IF RUNWAY LONG ENOUGH.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
LDGDEC-30119
02-1-023-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
30119
SELECTOR VALVE, HYD MODULE ASSY
J. COMPTON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
WITH VALVE OPEN, FLUID IS AVAILABLE ASSUMING HYDRAULIC
SYSTEM OKAY. CONTROL VALVE WILL STILL REGULATE PRESSURE TO
BRAKES BASED ON DEMAND.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-30117
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-023-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
30117
SELECTOR VALVE, HYD MODULE ASSY
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
LDGDEC-30118
02-1-023-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
30118
SELECTOR VALVE, HYD MODULE ASSY
J. COMPTON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IF VALVE JAMS CLOSED BEFORE BRAKES APPLIED, BRAKING WILL NOT
BE AVAILABLE THROUGH THIS SYSTEM (HALF BRAKING TO BOTH WHEELS IN
WHEEL-WELL). IF BRAKES APPLIED, FLUID WILL BE TRAPPED IN LINES
WITH CONTINUOUS PRESSURE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-30101
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-024-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
30101
ANTI-SKID SELECT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SWITCH IS REDUNDANT, BUT VEHICLE CAN LAND SAFELY WITHOUT
ANTISKID.
NO NASA CIL AVAILABLE ON THIS.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
LDGDEC-30106
02-1-025-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
30106
BRAKE CIRCUIT
J. COMPTON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[x]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-30105
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-025-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
30105
BRAKE CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
WITH BRAKE PRESSURE BEING APPLIED AT TOUCHDOWN, TIRE ON THAT
WHEEL WILL PROBABLY BLOW RIGHT AFTER TOUCHDOWN CAUSING POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-30108
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-026-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
30108
SKID CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO CIL AVAILABLE. WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF 12.5% BRAKING
CAPABILITY. SYSTEM IS NOT REDUNDANT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
LDGDEC-30107
02-1-026-2
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
30107
SKID CIRCUIT
J. COMPTON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF ANTISKID PROTECTION TO ONE BRAKE. SHOULD NOT
PRESENT A PROBLEM SINCE CREW NOTIFIED OF ANTISKID PROBLEM AND
SHOULD AVOID HEAVY BRAKING. CIL NOT NEEDED.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-30109
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-027-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
30109
ANTI-SKID FAIL CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
"(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
CIL NOT REQUIRED. FAIL CIRCUIT MONITORS SYSTEM AND IN WORST
CASE DESELECT A GOOD CIRCUIT RESULTING IN REDUCED BRAKING
CAPABILITY. CREW NOTIFIED OF A PROBLEM AND SHOULD AVOID HEAVY
BRAKING.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
LDGDEC-30109A
02-1-027-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
30109
ANTI-SKID FAIL CIRCUIT
J. COMPTON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
CIL NOT REQUIRED. FAIL CIRCUIT MONITORS SYSTEM AND IN WORST
CASE DESELECT A GOOD CIRCUIT RESULTING IN REDUCED BRAKING
CAPABILITY. CREW NOTIFIED OF A PROBLEM AND SHOULD AVOID HEAVY
BRAKING.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
LDGDEC-30122
02-1-028-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
30122
BRAKE / SKID CONTROL VALVE
J. COMPTON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / J [ J [ ] [ J [ J
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO CIL AVAILABLE.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-30121
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-028-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
30121
BRAKE / SKID CONTROL VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
ix]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-30120
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-028-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
30120
BRAKE / SKID CONTROL VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO CIL AVAILABLE.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-30115
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-029-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
30115
BY - PASS VALVE, HYD MODULE ASSY
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
LDGDEC-30116
02-1-029-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
30116
BY - PASS VALVE, HYD MODULE ASSY
J. COMPTON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[p] IF] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THIS VALVE HAS VERY LITTLE VALUE SINCE HYD. SYS. 1 IS
SHUTDOWN AND LINE CLOSED OFF DURING FLIGHT. FLUID NOT AVAILABLE
TO VALVE UNTIL JUST PRIOR TO LANDING. IF BOTH PRIMARY AND
STANDBY SYSTEMS FAIL TO OPEN BOTH SYSTEMS MUST BE SO SLUGGISH
THAT
THE BRAKES ON THIS CONTROL MODULE WON'T FUNCTION. ALSO SEE
30131.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-30131
NASA FMEA # : 02-1-029-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
30131
BY - PASS VALVE, HYD MODULE ASSY (SYS 2&3)
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SEE 30116. SINCE CIRC PUMPS ARE ON FOR THESE SYSTEMS
ONORBIT, THIS FAILURE COULD BE DETECTED INFLIGHT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-30112
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-030-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
30112
INLET FILTER, HYD MODULEASSY
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO CIL AVAILABLE. SHOULD BE 2/IR BECAUSE IF STANDBY FILTER
GETS CLOGGED, HALF BRAKING CAPABILITY TO BRAKES IN THAT WHEEL
WELL WILL BE LOST. SEE 30130.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
LDGDEC-30130
02-1-030-1
COMPARE [ N / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
30130
INLET FILTER, HYD MODULE ASSY (SYS i)
J. COMPTON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
SEE 30112 - SYS 1 DOES NOT PASS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
LDGDEC-30103
02-1-032-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
30103
BRAKE PEDAL TRANSDUCER
J. COMPTON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NASA CIL NOT AVAILABLE.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-63
APPENDIX C
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-30102
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-032-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
30102
BRAKEPEDAL TRANSDUCER
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-30110
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-033-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
30110
HYDRAULICPRESSUREREGULATOR
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[p]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-30111
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-033-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
30111
HYD PRESS REG (SYS 2 & 3)
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SEE 30129. SHOULD BE A 2 BECAUSE IF STANDBY SYSTEM HAD SOME
FAILURE VERY LITTLE BRAKING WOULD BE AVAILABLE - ONLY FROM LAST
REMAINING SYSTEM.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-30129
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-033-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
30129
HYD PRESSREG (SYS i)
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
SEE 30111 - DIFFERENT BECAUSE THIS DOESN'T PASS REDUNDANCY
SCREEN B.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
LDGDEC-21301
02-1-034-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
21301
MLG DOOR BOOSTER BUNGEE
J. COMPTON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS-.
ix]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-30125
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-044-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
30125
RUDDER / BRAKE PEDAL ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-30126
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-044-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
30126
RUDDER/ BRAKE PEDAL ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-30123
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-050-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
30123
EXCITER RING - WHEELSENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
EXCITER RING USED TO FEED WHEEL SPEED INFORMATION BACK TO
CIRCUIT CONTROL BOX. IF INPUT NOT RECEIVED THEN ANTISKID
FUNCTION FOR THAT CIRCUIT INOPERATIVE. CREW SHOULD GET FAILURE
LIGHT AND AVOID HEAVY BRAKING.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-30123A
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-051-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
30123
EXCITER RING - WHEEL SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
EXCITER RING USED TO FEED WHEEL SPEED INFORMATION BACK TO
CIRCUIT CONTROL BOX. IF INPUT NOT RECEIVED THEN ANTISKID
FUNCTION FOR THAT CIRCUIT INOPERATIVE. CREW SHOULD GET FAILURE
LIGHT AND AVOID HEAVY BRAKING.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-30123B
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-051-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
30123
EXCITER RING - WHEEL SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
EXCITER RING USED TO FEED WHEEL SPEED INFORMATION BACK TO
CIRCUIT CONTROL BOX. IF INPUT NOT RECEIVED THEN ANTISKID
FUNCTION FOR THAT CIRCUIT INOPERATIVE. CREW SHOULD GET FAILURE
LIGHT AND AVOID HEAVY BRAKING.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
LDGDEC-30123C
02-1-053-1
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
30123
EXCITER RING - WHEEL SENSOR
J. COMPTON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [p]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
EXCITER RING USED TO FEED WHEEL SPEED INFORMATION BACK TO
CIRCUIT CONTROL BOX. IF INPUT NOT RECEIVED THEN ANTISKID
FUNCTION FOR THAT CIRCUIT INOPERATIVE. CREW SHOULD GET FAILURE
LIGHT AND AVOID HEAVY BRAKING.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-30124
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-066-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
30124
STATORS, ROTORS, CLIPS
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ i/I ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IF LOCKUP OCCURS AT HIGH SPEED, TIRE WILL BLOW CAUSING
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-10215
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-075-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
10215
SHOCKSTRUT
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE NGSSA CAN LOSE THE NITROGEN PRESSURE DOWN TO 1
ATMOSPHERE AND STILL PERFORM A SAFE LANDING, BUT ONCE A LOSS OF
HYDRAULIC FLUID OCCURS THE SHOCK ATTENUATION CAPABILITY OF THE
NGSSA IS DEGRADED BEYOND THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A SAFE LANDING.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
LDGDEC-10216
02-1-075-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10216
SHOCK STRUT
W. WEISSINGER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
ALSO SEE IOA 10215.
[ ]
[x]
THIS ASSESSMENT RELATES DIRECTLY TO THE LOSS OF THE NITROGEN
ELASTIC MEDIUM.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
LDGDEC-10211
02-1-076-1
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOa [ 1 /1 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10211
TORQUE ARM ASSEMBLY
W. WEISSINGER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
C ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
A NOSE WHEEL SLAPDOWN WHERE THE NOSE WHEEL ROTATES BEYOND A
SAFE ANGLE OF ATTACK WILL CAUSE AN IMMEDIATE COLLAPSE OF THE NLG.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-10202
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-077-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10202
DRAG BRACE
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ HA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ALSO SEE 10203, 10202, 10221
CONCUR WITH THE BASIC ANALYSIS BUT THE ANALYSIS IS NOT
COMPREHENSIVE ENOUGH TO COVER SINGLE POINT FAILURES WITHIN THE
COMPONENT.
NASA FMEA TREATS THE DRAG BRACE AS A SINGLE COMPONENT WHEN
THERE ARE SEVERAL PARTS THAT ARE CRITICAL INDIVIDUALLY.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-79
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
LDGDEC-10203
02-1-077-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10203
DRAG BRACE TRUNION
W. WEISSINGER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS: INADEQUATE [ X ]
THE DRAG BRACE TRUNIONS WERE NOT CONSIDERED AS AN INDIVIDUAL
COMPONENT.
SEE LDGDEC-10203
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-10221
NASA FMEA #: 02-I-077-i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10221
DRAG BRACE
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
ALSO SEE 10202, 10203
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
FMEA 02-1-077-1 COVERS THE NLG DRAG BRACE ASSEMBLY BUT IT
DOES NOT COVER THE CRITICAL PARTS INDIVIDUALLY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-10222
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-077-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10222
DRAG BRACE TRUNION
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ AN] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
ALSO SEE 10202, 10203
[ ]
[ ]
FMEA 02-1-077-1 COVERS THE NLG DRAG BRACE ASSEMBLY BUT IT
DOES NOT COVER THE CRITICAL PARTS INDIVIDUALLY.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-10223
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-077-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
10223
DRAGBRACETRUNION
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ AN] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
ALSO SEE 10202, 10203
[x]
[ ]
FMEA 02-1-077-1 COVERS THE NLG DRAG BRACE ASSEMBLY BUT IT
DOES NOT COVER THE CRITICAL PARTS INDIVIDUALLY.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-10224
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-077-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
10224
SUPPORTBEAM
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [AN] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
ALSO SEE 10202, 10203
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
FMEA 02-1-077-1 COVERS THE NLG DRAG BRACE ASSEMBLY BUT IT
DOES NOT COVER THE CRITICAL PARTS INDIVIDUALLY.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-84
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-10204
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-078-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10204
LOCK BRACE ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-85
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-10205
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-079-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10205
DOWNLOCK BUNGEE
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
ALSO SEE 10206
[ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
[ ]
THE DOWNLOCK BUNGEE IS A MECHANICAL DEVICE THAT IF BENT OR
JAMMED IN THE EXTENDED POSITION COULD CAUSE A FORCE THAT WOULD
UNLOCK THE LOCK BRACE.
HYDRAULICS - THE EXTEND/RETRACT HYD ACTUATOR IS THE ONLY
REDUNDANT ITEM. WHEN THE VEHICLE IS SHUT DOWN POST LANDING THERE
IS NO REDUNDANCY. THE NASA FMEA/CIL DOES NOT CONSIDER APU
SHUTDOWN OCCURRING BEFORE CREW EGRESS.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-86
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-10206
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-079-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
10206
DOWNLOCKBUNGEE
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SEE 10205.
THERE WILL BE NO COMPLICATIONS THROUGHOUT THE LANDING UNTIL
AFTER THE VEHICLE IS SHUTDOWN. ONCE THE HYDRAULICS SYSTEM IS
DEACTIVATED THERE IS NO SYSTEM TO HOLD THE LOCK BRACE IN
POSITION, AND A GUST OF WIND, AN IMPACT FROM APPROACHING VEHICLES
OR MOVEMENT INSIDE THE VEHICLE COULD CAUSE NLG COLLAPSE. A
COLLAPSE OF THE NLG WOULD CAUSE STRUCTURAL DAMAGE AND A POSSIBLE
LOSS OF LIFE.
THIS SITUATION CAN BE BYPASSED BY INSTALLING THE LANDING
GEAR SAFETY PINS IN THE LOCK BRACE PRIOR TO HYDRAULICS SYSTEM 1
SHUTDOWN.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-87
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
LDGDEC-10214 BASELINE [ X ]
02-1-080-1 NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10214
WEIGHT ON WHEELS SENSORS - NLG
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [NA] [P] [
[P] [P] [P] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
2 SWITCHES ARE ON THE NLG, EITHER OF WHICH WILL ACTIVATE NWS
AND B&A'S. THE SWITCHES CAN ALSO BE BYPASSED VIA THE ET SEP
SWITCH/SRB SEP SWITCH.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-88
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-10218
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-080-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10218
WEIGHT ON WHEELS SENSORS - NLG
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[p] [P] [P]
[ ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
SEE 10214, 10219.
- SWITCHES CAN BE BYPASSED BY THE ET/SRB SEP SWITCH.
- DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING CAN BE USED AS BACKUP STEERING.
- NASA FMEA ASSUMES THE FAILURE OF BOTH SENSOR SWITCHES.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-89
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
H DW/FUN C
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
LDGDEC-10219
02-1-080-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
i02_9
WEIGHT ON WHEELS SENSORS - NLG
W. WEISSINGER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
B
[ NA]
[ P ]
[N]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [P] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
SEE 10214.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
- SENSOR CAN BE BYPASSED WITH THE ET/SRB SEP SWITCH.
- DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING CAN BE USED AS THE ALTERNATE STEERING
METHOD.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-90
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-I0207
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-081-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10207
NLG - DOWN AND LOCK SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-91
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-10208
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-081-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
1O208
NLG - DOWN AND LOCK SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
MECHANICAL FAILURE CAUSING A LOSS OF SIGNAL.
C ]
(ADD/DELETE )
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-92
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
LDGDEC-10217
02-1-082-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10217
UPLOCK ROLLER RETAINING ASSEMBLY
W. WEISSINGER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA 02-1-083-1 COVERS THE SAME ASSY BUT THE FAILURE
MODES ARE NOT ALIKE.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-93
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-10701
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-082-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10701
NLG UPLOCK HOOK ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[x]
C ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-94
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-10217A
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-083-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10217
UPLOCK ROLLER RETAINING ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA 02-1-082-1 COVERS THE SAME ASSY BUT THE FAILURE
MODES ARE NOT ALIKE.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-95
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-10209
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-085-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10209
STEERING COLLAR ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ONLY PORTION OF THE FLIGHT THAT THIS FUNCTION CAN BE
OBSERVED IS DURING THE LANDING ROLLOUT AND AT THAT POINT THE
INFORMATION IS VIRTUALLY USELESS. IN ORDER TO RECEIVE A FAILURE
SIGNAL THE NLG MUST HAVE WEIGHT ON THE NLG WHICH MEANS THAT
THE VEHICLE IS IN THE ROLLOUT PHASE OF THE LANDING. IF A FAILURE
OCCURS THE PILOT WOULD HAVE TAKEN OVER MANUALLY BEFORE HE WOULD
RECOGNIZE THE FAILURE SIGNAL ON PANEL F3. THE VEHICLE WILL STOP
BEFORE A COMPLETE ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION IS PERFORMED.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-96
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-III02
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-097-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
11102
NLG B/U PYROUPLOCKRELEASEMECH
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
SYSTEM IS NOT USED UNLESS HYDRAULIC UPLOCK RELEASE SYSTEM
FAILS. IF THIS SYSTEM FAILS WHEN CALLED ON TO FUNCTION, THERE IS
NO OTHER BACKUP.
ACCORDING TO THE REDUNDANCY RULES IN 22206, THIS SYSTEM IS A
2/IR CRITICALITY BUT, A FAILED HYDRAULICS SYSTEM ACTIVATES THIS
SYSTEM. THIS SYSTEMS FAILURE WILL NOT ACTIVATE THE HYDRAULICS.
THERE IS A LINEAR OPERATION HERE THAT WILL NOT ALLOW
REVERSAL OF THE ROLES.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-97
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-III01
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-097-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
iii01
NLG B/U PYROUPLOCKRELEASEMECH
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
ix]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-98
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-10501
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-098-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10501
NLG DOOR EXTEND / RETRACT MECHANISM
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ I [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-99
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
LDGDEC-10901
02-1-098-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10901
NLG DOOR HOOK ACT LINKAGE
J. COMPTON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
ix]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-100
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-10501A
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-099-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10501
NLG DOOR EXTEND / RETRACT MECHANISM
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DOORS COULD IMPACT AND DAMAGE ELECTRICAL AND HYDRAULIC
COMPONENTS OR OTHER ITEMS LOCATED ON THE SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-101
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-10901A
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-099-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
10901
NLG DOORHOOKACT LINKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-i02
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-II301
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-102-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
11301
NLG DOOR BUNGEE ASSIST ASSY
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[x]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-I03
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
LDGDEC-II202
02-1-104-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
11202
NLG EXTENSION BOOSTER PYRO ACT
J. COMPTON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-104
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ].
COMPARE [ / ]
LDGDEC-II201
02-1-104-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING DECELERATION SYSTEMS
11201
NLG EXTENSION BOOSTER PYRO ACT
J. COMPTON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IX]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-I05
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
LDGDEC-10201
02-1-109-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10201
NOSE LANDING GEAR TRUNION
W. WEISSINGER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
ALSO SEE 10203, 10222, 10223
[ ]
[x]
THE NASA FMEA DOES NOT COVER ANYTHING BUT THE NLG SHOCK
STRUT TRUNIONS. THERE ARE SEVERAL OTHER TRUNNIONS IN THE NLG AND
THEY ARE LOCATED IN THE NLG DRAGBRACE, THE NLG LOCKBRACE AND THE
SUPPORT BEAM
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-I06
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
LDGDEC-10101
02-1-110-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10101
TIRES, NLG TYPE II
W. WEISSINGER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-I07
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
LDGDEC-21005
02-6-G08-A01
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
21005
MLG UPLOCK ACTUATOR
J. COMPTON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [F] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS :
REDUNDANCY SCREEN B FAILS BECAUSE HYD. SYS. 1 FLUID IS NOT
CIRCULATED TO THIS ACTUATOR ONORBIT, THUS FAILURE NOT DETECTED.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-I08
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-21003
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-G08-A02
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
21003
MLG UPLOCK ACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C J IF] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF HYDRAULICS SYSTEM i. IF SYSTEM FAILS, THEN
THE ORBITER IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE.
PYRO BACKUP. HYDRAULIC FLUID IS NOT CIRCULATED TO THIS ACTUATOR
ONORBIT, THUS FAILURE CANNOT BE DETECTED -
FAILS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-I09
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-21006
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-G08-A03
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
21006
MLG UPLOCK ACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-II0
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
LDGDEC-20404
02-6-G09-A01
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20404
MLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
J. COMPTON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
SAME FOR NOSE LANDING GEAR - SEE LDGDEC - 10404.
[x]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-lll
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-20402
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-G09-A02
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20402
MLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF HYDRAULICS SYSTEM i. IF SYSTEM FAILS, THEN
THE ORBITER IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE.
THE GEAR HAS A PYRO BACKUP TO UNLOCK THE GEAR. IF IT FAILS, THE
GEAR WILL NOT DEPLOY.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-I12
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-20403
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-G09-A03
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20403
MLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-I13
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LDGDEC-20416
02-6-G09-A04
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20416
MLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
REDUNDANCY SCREEN B FAILS BECAUSE HYD SYS 1 FLUID IS NOT
CIRCULATED TO THIS ACTUATOR ONORBIT, THUS, THE FAILURE IS NOT
DETECTED.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-I14
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
LDGDEC-20412
02-6-G09-B01
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20412
MLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
J. COMPTON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-i15
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-20413
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-G09-B02
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20413
MLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
ix]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-I16
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-20411
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-G09-C01
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
20411
MLG EXTEND/ RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-I17
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-20409
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-G09-D01
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20409
MLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A S C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-i18
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
LDGDEC-20410
02-6-G09-D02
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20410
MLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
J. COMPTON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-I19
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-20408
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-G09-E01
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20408
MLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-120
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
LDGDEC-20408A
02-6-G09-E02
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20408
MLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
J. COMPTON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-121
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
LDGDEC-20414
02-6-G09-F01
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20414
MLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
J. COMPTON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
>
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[x]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-122
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-20406
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-G09-G01
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20406
MLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-123
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-20415
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-G09-H01
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
20415
MLG EXTEND/ RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
r ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C I ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-124
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
LDGDEC-20415A
02-6-G09-H02
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20415
MLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
J. COMPTON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-125
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-20407
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-G09-J01
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID :
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20407
MLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-126
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
LDGDEC-20407A
02-6-G09-J02
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20407
MLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
J. COMPTON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-127
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
LDGDEC-20405
02-6-G09-K01
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20405
MLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
J. COMPTON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-128
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
LDGDEC-30128
02-6-G12-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
30128
BRAKE HYDRAULIC LINE HEATERS
J. COMPTON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
CIL NOT AVAILABLE.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-129
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
LDGDEC-10404
02-6-H01-A01
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10404
NLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACTUATOR
J. COMPTON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
SAME FOR MAIN LANDING GEAR - SEE LDGDEC 20404.
ix]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-130
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-10402
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-H01-A02
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
10402
NLG EXTEND/ RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS: INADEQUATE [ X ]
POSSIBLE LOSS OF HYDRAULICS SYSTEM I. IF THE SYSTEM FAILS,
THEN THE ORBITER IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF LIFE OR
VEHICLE. THE GEAR HAS A PYRO BACKUP TO UNLOCK THE GEAR. IF IT
FAILS, THE GEAR WILL NOT DEPLOY.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-131
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
LDGDEC-10403
02-6-H01-A03
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10403
NLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACTUATOR
J. COMPTON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-132
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-10416
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-H01-A04
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10416
NLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
REDUNDANCY SCREEN B BECAUSE HYD SYS 1 FLUID IS NOT
CIRCULATED TO THIS ACTUATOR ONORBIT, THUS THE FAILURE IS NOT
DETECTED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-10412
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-H01-B01
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10412
NLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-10413
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-H01-B02
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10413
NLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACTUATOR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-10411
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-H01-C01
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10411
NLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
LDGDEC-10409
02-6-H01-D01
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10409
NLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACTUATOR
J. COMPTON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-10410
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-H01-D02
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
10410
NLG EXTEND/ RETRACT HYD STRUT ACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
LDGDEC-10408
02-6-H01-E01
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10408
NLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACTUATOR
J. COMPTON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-10408A
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-H01-E02
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10408
NLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-10414
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-H01-F01
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10414
NLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-10406
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-H01-G01
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID :
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10406
NLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
LDGDEC-10415
02-6-H01-H01
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10415
NLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACTUATOR
J. COMPTON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
LDGDEC-10415A
02-6-H01-H02
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10415
NLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACTUATOR
J. COMPTON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-10407
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-H01-J01
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
10407
NLG EXTEND/ RETRACT HYD STRUT ACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-10407A
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-H01-J02
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
10407
NLG EXTEND/ RETRACT HYD STRUT ACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
LDGDEC-10405
02-6-H01-K01
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10405
NLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACTUATOR
J. COMPTON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ J
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
LDGDEC-II005
02-6-H03-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
11005
NLG UPLOCK ACTUATOR
J. COMPTON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
REDUNDANCY SCREEN B FAILS BECAUSE HYD SYS. 1 FLUID IS NOT
CIRCULATED TO THIS ACTUATOR ONORBIT, THUS FAILURE NOT DETECTED.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-II003
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-H03-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
11003
NLG UPLOCKACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF HYDRAULICS SYSTEM i. IF SYSTEM FAILS, THEN
THE ORBITER IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE.
PYRO BACKUP. HYDRAULIC FLUID IS NOT CIRCULATED TO THIS ACTUATOR
ONORBIT, THUS FAILURE CANNOT BE DETECTED - FAILS REDUNDANCY
SCREEN B.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-II006
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-H03-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM".
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
11006
NLG UPLOCK ACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS :
C ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31147
NASA FMEA #: 05-06BA-2401-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31147
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE i)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
H DW/FUN C A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF FMEA 2401-1.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31147A
NASA FMEA #: 05-06BA-2401-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM :
MDAC ID:
ITEM :
EPD&C
31147
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE i)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [. ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF FMEA 2401-2, AND IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT FMEA 2401-2 SHOULD COMBINED WITH 2401-1. NASA
REEVALUATION COMBINED FMEA 2401-2 IN WITH 2401-1.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31224
NASA FMEA #: 05-2106-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31224
TOGGLE SWITCH, 3PST
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [P] [P] [P] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE "MAIN C" TOGGLE
SWITCH.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31155
NASA FMEA #: 05-2409-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31155
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE 3)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE TYPE 3 HDC'S.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31163
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-200200-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31163
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE II)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] . [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION.
NASA GENERATED SEPARATE FMEA'S TO COVER THE HDC'S FAILURE MODES
INSTEAD OF LUMPING THEM TOGETHER WITH UNLIKE COMPONENTS IN FMEA
200200-1. REFER TO LDGDEC-31164.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31164
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-200200-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31164
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE II)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA GENERTED SEPARATE FMEA'S TO COVER THE FAILURE MODES INSTEAD
OF LUMPING THEM TOGETHER WITH UNLIKE COMPONENTS IN FMEA 200200-1.
FAILURE MODES EVALUATED IN FMEAS 05-6BA-2209-I, 2209-2, 2356-1,
2356-2, 2408-1, 2408-2, 2409-1, 2409-2, 2410-1, 2410-2,
2575-1, AND 2575-2.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31165
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-200200-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
EPD&C
31165
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE III)
G. BEAIRD
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA INCORPORATED FMEA INTO OTHER FMEA. SEE ASSESSMENT LDGDEC-
31164.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31166
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-200200-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31166
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE III)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ F ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA INCORPORATED FMEA INTO OTHER FMEAS. SEE ASSESSMENT LDGDEC-
31164.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-158
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31181
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-200200-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31181
MAIN GEAR BRAKE UPLOCK RELEASE CIRCUITS 1 & 2
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS: (i) DELETING THIS FMEA AND COVERING EACH TYPE OF
COMPONENT WITH ITS OWN FMEA (E.G. MDAC ID'S 31120, 31128, 31129,
31156, 31157, 31163 THROUGH 31166 COVER ALL THE COMPONENTS LISTED
IN THIS FMEA) INTO OTHER FMEAS, REFER TO MDAC ASSESSMENTS
NOTED ABOVE.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-159
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31119
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2113-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31119
EVENT INDICATORS (6)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE LANDING GEAR EVENT
INDICATORS.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-160
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31113
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2115-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31113
PUSHBUTTON SWITCH (2), LANDING GEAR DOWN
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PROVIDES REDUNDANT MANUAL "ON" CONTROL FROM CONTROL BUS TO
LATCHING RELAYS FOR LANDING GEAR DOWN CIRCUIT. AFTER FURTHER
REVIEW/ANALYSIS IOA DOES CONCUR FULLY WITH NASA'S EVALUATION.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-161
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31114A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2115-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31114
PUSHBUTTON SWITCH (2), LANDING GEAR DOWN
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] •
] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PROVIDES REDUNDANT MANUAL "ON" CONTROL FROM CONTROL BUS TO
LATCHING RELAYS FOR LANDING GEAR DOWN CIRCUIT. IOA DOES CONCUR
WITH NASA'S EVALUATION THAT FMEA 2115-2 (SHORTS TO GROUND) IS NOT
A CREDIBLE FAILURE AND THAT IT BE DELETED.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-162
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31114
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2115-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31114
PUSHBUTTON SWITCH (2), LANDING GEAR DOWN
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 3 [ 3 [ ] [ 3 [D3
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PROVIDES REDUNDANT MANUAL "ON" CONTROL FROM CONTROL BUS TO
LATCHING RELAYS FOR LANDING GEAR DOWN CIRCUIT. IOA DOES NOT
CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION AND IOA RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING FMEA
2115-3 CRITICALITY TO 3/3.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-163
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31115
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2116-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31115
LANDING GEAR TOGGLE SWITCH, S13
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION, FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT ON
SUBSYSTEM. CB60 REMAINS "OFF" UNTIL NEEDED.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-164
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31115A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2116-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31115
LANDING GEAR TOGGLE SWITCH, S13
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE FAILURE MODE OF FMEA 2116-2 BE DELETED,
BECAUSE IT IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE FOR THIS COMPONENT. NASA
EVALUATION DELETED NASA 2116-2.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-165
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31115B
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2116-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31115
LANDING GEAR TOGGLE SWITCH, S13
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION, FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT
ON SUBSYSTEM. CB60 REMAINS "OFF" UNTIL NEEDED. IOA RECOMMENDS
DOWNGRADING THE CRITICALITY AND COMBINING FMEA'S 2116-1 AND 2116-
3 TOGETHER, SINCE THEY ARE BOTH CRITICALITY 3/3, TO
CONFORM TO NSTS 22206.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-166
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31117
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2117-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31117
PUSHBUTTON SWITCH, LDG GR ARM, 4PDT, ILLUMINATED
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
PROVIDES REDUNDANT MANUAL "ON" CONTROL FROM CONTROL BUS TO
LATCHING RELAYS FOR LANDING GEAR ARM CIRCUIT. IOA DOES NOT
CONCUR FULLY WITH NASA'S EVALUATION AND IOA RECOMMENDS: (I)
CHANGING THE REDUNDANCY SCREENS, IT FAILS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B,
AND
LOWERING THE CRITICALITY TO 3/IR.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-167
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31118A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2117-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ILLUMINATED
EPD&C
31118
PUSHBUTTON SWITCH, LDG GR ARM, 4 PDT,
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PROVIDES REDUNDANT MANUAL "ON" CONTROL FROM CONTROL BUS TO
LATCHING RELAYS FOR LANDING GEAR ARM CIRCUIT. NASA FMEA 2117-2
(SHORTS TO GROUND) IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE AND IOA RECOMMENDS
THAT IT BE DELETED FROM THE CIL.
NASA DELETED THIS FMEA FROM THE BASELINE
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-168
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31118
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2117-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ILLUMINATED
EPD&C
31118
PUSHBUTTON SWITCH, LDG GR ARM, 4 PDT,
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PROVIDES REDUNDANT MANUAL "ON" CONTROL FROM CONTROL BUS TO
LATCHING RELAYS FOR LANDING GEAR ARM CIRCUIT. IOA DOES NOT
CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION AND IOA RECOMMENS DOWNGRADING FMEA
2117-3 CRITICALITY TO 3/3, AND DELETING IT FROM THE CIL.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-169
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31101
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2118-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31101
PROXIMITY SENSOR BOX (2)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE PROXIMITY SENSOR BOXES
FOR THE FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-170
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31100
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2204-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31100
ISOLATION DIODE (12), 1 AMP
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE ISOLATION DIODES.
LOSS OF EVENT INDICATION NOT CRITICAL TO FLIGHT.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-171
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31100A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2204-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31100
ISOLATION DIODE (12), 1 AMP
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE ISOLATION DIODES.
LOSS OF EVENT INDICATION NOT CRITICAL TO FLIGHT.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-172
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31105
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2205-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31105
TRANSIENT SUPPRESSOR DIODE (4), 3 AMPS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF FMEA 2205-1 FOR THE
TRANSIENT SUPPRESSOR DIODES.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-173
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31105A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2205-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31105
TRANSIENT SUPPRESSOR DIODE (4), 3 AMPS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION AND IOA RECOMMENDS
DOWNGRADING THE CRITICALITY AND REMOVING THIS ITEM FROM CIL.
LOSS OF TWO DIODES IS LOSS OF A HYDRAULIC SYSTEM WHICH THEN
RESULTS IN 3/IR CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-174
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31107
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2206-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31107
BLOCKING DIODE (2) 12 AMP, 400V
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLI GHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION AND RATIONALE, LOSS OF
ELECTRICAL POWER MIGHT LEAD TO LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-175
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31108
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2206-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31108
BLOCKING DIODE (2) 12 AMP, 400V
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE BLOCKING DIODES.
BLOCKING DIODE FAILS SHORTED, POSSIBLE LOSS OF RETURN BUS
ISOLATION MIGHT OCCUR.
IF A
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-176
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31109
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2207-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31109
BLOCKING DIODE (2) 12 AMP
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION AND RATIONALE, LOSS OF
ELECTRICAL POWER FROM AN RPC MIGHT CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-177
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31110
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2207-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31110
BLOCKING DIODE (2) 12 AMP, 400V
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION, POSSIBLE LOSS OF UNIT
CAPABILITY TO ISOLATE THE TWO RPC OUTPUTS.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-178
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31122
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2208-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31122
BLOCKING DIODE (2) 1 AMP
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE BLOCKING DIODES.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-179
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31122A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2208-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
EPD&C
31122
BLOCKING DIODE (2) 1 AMP
G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A S
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE BLOCKING DIODES.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-180
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31121
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2209-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31121
BLOCKING DIODE (6) 3 AMP
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION.
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-181
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31120
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2209-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM-.
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31120
BLOCKING DIODE (6) 3 AMP
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA FMEA EVALUATION.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-182
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31111
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2243-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31111
CIRCUIT BREAKERS (2), LG SENSORS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-183
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31112
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2243-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31112
CIRCUIT BREAKERS (2), LG SENSORS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION, FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT ON
SUBSYSTEM, CIRCUIT BREAKERS ARE NORMALLY IN A CLOSED POSITION.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-184
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31123
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2244-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31123
CIRCUIT BREAKER (3 AMP)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE LDG ARM/DN RESET
CIRCUIT BREAKER.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-185
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31123A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2244-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31123
CIRCUIT BREAKER (3 AMP)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE LDG ARM/DN RESET
CIRCUIT BREAKER.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-186
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31126
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2300-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31126
GENERAL PURPOSE FUSE, (8), 1 AMP
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [F]
[P] [F]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION.
[x]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-187
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31126A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2300-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31126
GENERAL PURPOSE FUSE,
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
(8) , 1 AMP
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION AND DELETING FMEA 2300-2
BECAUSE IT IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-188
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31127
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2301-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
3 i12"7
GENERAL PURPOSE FUSE (i AMP)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [F]
[P] [F]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION.
ix]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-189
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31127A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2301-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31127
GENERAL PURPOSE FUSE (I AMP)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION THAT FMEA 2301-2 BE
DELETED BECAUSE ITS FAILURE MODE IS NOT CREDIBLE FOR THIS
COMPONENT.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-190
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31125
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2302-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31125
GENERAL PURPOSE FUSE (5 AMP)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_ [N/ ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR FULLY WITH NASA'S EVALUATION AND IOA
RECOMMENDS: CHANGING THE REDUNDANCY SCREENS SINCE IT FAILS
REDUNDANCY SCREEN B, AND DOWNGRADING THE CRITICALITY TO 3/IR.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-191
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31137
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2303-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31137
GENERAL PURPOSE FUSE (2), 5 AMP
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [F] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR FULLY WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF FMEA 2303-1
AND IOA RECOMMENDS CHANGING THE REDUNDANCY SCREEN B TO CONFORM TO
NSTS 22206.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-192
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31137A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2303-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31137
GENERALPURPOSEFUSE (2), 5 AMP
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF FMEA 2303-2 THAT THE
FMEA AND CIL REFERENCE BE DELETED BECAUSE IT IS NOT A CREDIBLE
FAILURE MODE FOR A FUSE.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-193
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31130
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2351-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31130
ISOLATION RESISTORS (18); 5.1K, I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE ISOLATION
RESISTORS.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-194
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31130A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2351-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31130
ISOLATION RESISTORS (18); 5.1K, I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR FULLY WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE ISOLATION
RESISTORS, RECOMMENDS THAT FMEA 2351-2 BE DELETED BECAUSE FAIL
MODE IS NOT CREDIBLE FOR THIS TYPE OF RESISTOR.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-195
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31132
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2352-I
SUBSYSTEM."
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31132
RESISTOR (3), 1.2K, 2W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE CURRENT LIMITING
RESISTOR.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-196
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31136
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2353-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31136
RESISTOR (3), 1.2K, 2W
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THECURRENT LIMITING
RESISTORS IN THE "LDG GR DOWN" STATUS/MONITORING CIRCUITS.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-197
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31134
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2354-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31134
RESISTOR (2), 1.8K, I/4W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATIQN OF THE BLEED-OFF RESISTOR IN A
RPC/MDM MONITORING CIRCUIT.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-198
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31128
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2356-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
EPD&C
31128
RESISTOR (12), 10.2 OHMS, 2W
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION.
[x]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-199
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31129
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2356-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31129
RESISTOR (12),10.2 OHMS, 2W
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE CURRENT LIMITING
RESISTORS.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-200
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31138
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2357-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31138
RESISTOR _2), 2.2K, i/2W
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ .] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE ISOLATION/CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTORS USED IN RPC OUTPUT/MDM MONITORING CIRCUITS.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-201
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31133
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2360-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31133
RESISTOR (6), 100K, I/8W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ .] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE CURRENT LIMITING
RESISTOR.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-202
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31135
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2361-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31135
RESISTOR (8), 17.4K, I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE GSE TEST CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTORS.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-203
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31135A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2361-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31135
RESISTOR (8), 17.4K, I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE GSE TEST CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTORS.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-204
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31139
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2362-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31139
RESISTOR, 1.2K, 2W
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [.3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE CURRENT LIMITING
RESISTOR FOR THE LANDING STRUT ACTUATOR POSITION INDICATOR.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-205
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31139A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2362-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM'.
EPD&C
31139
RESISTOR, 1.2K, 2W
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE CURRENT LIMITING
RESISTOR FOR THE LANDING STRUT ACTUATOR POSITION INDICATOR.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-206
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31131
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2363-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31131
RESISTOR, 7.5K, 2W
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE CURRENT LIMITING
RESISTOR.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-207
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31140
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2400-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31140
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER(TYPE i)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE TYPE 1 HDC (FAILURE
MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT) THAT CONNECTS MAIN DC BUS POWER TO THE WOW
CIRCUITS. FMEA DELETED FROM LDG/DECL TRANSFERRED TO NOSE WHEEL
STEERING.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-208
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31141
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2400-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31141
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE i)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE TYPE 1 HDC (FAILURE
MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT) THAT CONNECTS MAIN DC BUS POWER TO THE
WOW CIRCUITS. FMEA TRANSFERRED TO NOSE WHEEL STEERING SUBSYSTEM.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-209
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
LDGDEC-31149
05-6BA-2401-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
EPD&C
31149
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE i)
G. BEAIRD
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE TYPE 1 HDC FOR THE
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-210
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31143
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2402-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31143
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE i)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF FMEA 2402-1.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-211
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID :
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
LDGDEC-31143A
05-6BA-2402-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
EPD&C
31143
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE I)
G. BEAIRD
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF FMEA 2402-2. NASA
INCORPORATED FMEA 2402-2 INTO 2401-1.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-212
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31144
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2402-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31144
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE i)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE TYPE 1 HDC FOR THE
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT. NASA INCORPORATED FMEA/CIL
2402-3 INTO 2401-3.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-213
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31148
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2403-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31148
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE i)
LEAD ANALYST : G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF FMEA 2403-1 AND 2403-2,
AND IOA RECOMMENDS NASA FMEA 2403-1 AND 2403-2 SHOULD BE COMBINED
INTO ONE FMEA TO CONFORM TO NSTS 22206. NASA INCORPORATED 2403-2
INTO 2403-1.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-214
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31148A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2403-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31148
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE i)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA E 3 /3 ] £ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] E
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF FMEA 2403-1 AND 2403-2,
AND IOA RECOMMENDS NASA FMEA 2403-1 AND 2403-2 SHOULD BE COMBINED
INTO ONE FMEA TO CONFORM TO NSTS 22206. NASA INCORPORATED 2403-2
INTO 2403-1.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-215
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31142
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2404-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31142
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE i)
LEAD ANALYST : G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF FMEA'S 2404-1 AND 2404-
2 FOR THE TYPE 1 HDC (FAILURE MODES: LOSS OF OUTPUT, INADVERTENT
OUTPUT) TO POWER THE DOWN COILS OF THE TWO NLG EVENT INDICATORS.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING FMEA 2404-1 AND 2404-2 TOGETHER
TO CONFORM TO NSTS 22206. NASA INCORPORATED 2404-1 AND 2404-2
INTO 2403-1.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-216
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31142A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2404-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31142
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE I)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF FMEA'S 2404-1 AND 2404-
2 FOR THE TYPE 1 HDC (FAILURE MODES: LOSS OF OUTPUT, INADVERTENT
OUTPUT) TO POWER THE DOWN COILS OF THE TWO NLG EVENT INDICATORS.
IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING FMEA 2404-1 AND 2404-2 TOGETHER
TO CONFORM TO NSTS 22206. NASA INCORPORATED 2404-1 AND 2404-2
INTO 2403-1.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-217
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31142B
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2404-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31142
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE i)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT FMEA 2404-3 BE DELETED BECAUSE IT IS NOT A
CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE FOR THE TYPE 1 HDC. NASA INCORPORATED 2403
INTO 2403-1.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-218
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
LDGDEC-31146
05-6BA-2405-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
EPD&C
31146
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER(TYPE i)
G. BEAIRD
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE TYPE 1 HDC'S, IOA
RECOMMENDS COMBINING FMEA'S 2405-1 AND 2405-2 TOGETHER TO CONFORM
TO NSTS 22206.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-219
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31146A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2405-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM".
EPD&C
31146
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE i)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE TYPE 1 HDC'S. IOA
RECOMMENDS COMBINING FMEA'S 2405-1 AND 2405-2 TOGETHER TO CONFORM
TO NSTS 22206. NASA INCORPORATE 2405-2 INTO 2405-1.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-220
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31146B
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2405-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31146
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE i)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE TYPE 1 HDC'S
AND RECOMMENDS DELETING FMEA 2405-3 BECAUSE ITS FAILURE MODE IS
NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE. NASA INCORPORATED 2405-3 INTO 2405-1.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-221
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31145
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2406-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31145
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER(TYPE i)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] C ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR FULLY WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE TYPE 1
HDC, IOA RECOMMENDS: DOWNGRADING CRITICALITY TO 3/3 AND COMBINING
FMEA'S 2406-1 AN 2406-2 TOGETHER TO CONFORM TO NSTS 22206.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-222
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31145A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2406-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31145
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE I)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE TYPE 1 HDC, IOA
RECOMMENDS: COMBINING FMEA'S 2406-1 AN 2406-2 TOGETHER TO CONFORM
TO NSTS 22206.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-223
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
LDGDEC-31145B
05-6BA-2406-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
EPD&C
31145
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER(TYPE i)
G. BEAIRD
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE TYPE 1 HDC AND
RECOMMENDS DELETING FMEA 2406-3 BECAUSE ITS FAILURE MODE IS NOT A
CREDIBLE FAILURE. NASA INCORPORATE 2406-3 INTO 2406-1, WHICH IS
NOT VIABLE AS 2406-1 HAS 3/IR CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-224
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31158
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2407-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31158
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE I)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EyALUATION OF THE TYPE 1 HDC'S.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-225
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31158A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2407-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31158
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE i)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different fromNASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE TYPE 1 HDC'S.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-226
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31158B
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2407-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31158
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE i)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE TYPE 1 HDC'S
FOR FMEA 2407-3 AND RECOMMENDS THAT IT BE DELETED BECAUSE IT IS
NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE. NASA INCORPORATE 2407-3 INTO 2407-1
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-227
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31156
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2408-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31156
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE i)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE TYPE 1 HDC'S.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-228
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31157
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2408-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31157
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE I)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE TYPE ONE HDC'S FOR THE
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-229
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31154
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2409-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31154
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE 3)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [. P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_ [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] IF] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE TYPE 3 HDC'S.
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING THE FMEA TO THE CIL BECAUSE IT FAILS
REDUNDANCY SCREEN B.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-230
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31159
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2410-I
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31159
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE II)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE TYPE 2 HDC'S.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-231
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31160
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2410-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31160
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE II)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE TYPE 2 HDC'S.
IX]
]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-232
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31152
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2413-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31152
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE II)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[P] [F] [P] [X]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] E ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE TYPE 2 HDC'S.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-233
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31153
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2413-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31153
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE II)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] " [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS: INADEQUATE [ ]
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE TYPE 2 HDC'S FOR THE
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-234
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31150
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2415-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31150
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE i)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
r i 1 r t c ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE TYPE 1 HDC'S.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-235
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
LDGDEC-31151
05-6BA-2415-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
EPD&C
31151
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE I)
G. BEAIRD
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE TYPE 1 HDC'S FOR THE
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-236
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31168
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2501-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CIRCUITS
EPD&C
31168
LATCHING RELAY (6), LDG GR 'ARM' CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST : G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF (FMEA 2501-1) THE LATCHING
RELAYS FOR THE LANDING GEAR ARM CONTROL CIRCUITS.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-237
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31168A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2501-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CIRCUITS
EPD&C
31168
LATCHING RELAY (6), LDG GR 'ARM' CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
FMEA 2501-2 HAS A NONCREDIBLE FAILURE MODE (SHORTS TO GROUND) AND
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE FMEA AND ITS CIL BE DELETED. NASA
INCORPORATED 2501-2 INTO 2501-1.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-238
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31169
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2501-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CIRCUITS
EPD&C
31169
LATCHING RELAY (6), LDG GR 'ARM' CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE LDG GR "ARM" LATCHING
RELAYS FOR THE FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-239
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31170
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2502-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CIRCUITS
EPD&C
3117D
LATCHING RELAY (6), LDG GR 'DOWN' CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF FMEA 2502-1 FOR THE LDG GR
"DOWN" RELAYS.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-240
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31170A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2502-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CIRCUITS
EPD&C
31170
LATCHING RELAY (6), LDG GR 'DOWN' CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT FMEA 2502-2 AND ITS CIL BE DELETED, BECAUSE
IT HAS A NONCREDIBLE FAILURE MODE: SHORTS TO GROUND. NASA
INCORPORATE 2502-2 INTO 2502-1.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-241
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31171
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2502-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CIRCUITS
EPD&C
31171
LATCHING RELAY (6), LDG GR 'DOWN' CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF FMEA 2502-3 FOR THE FAILURE
MODE: FAILS CLOSED.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-242
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31172
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2503-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31172
GENERALPURPOSERELAY (2)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P] [P] [ P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE GENERAL PURPOSE
RELAYS.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-243
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31172A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2503-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31172
GENERAL PURPOSE RELAY (2)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE GENERAL PURPOSE
RELAYS.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-244
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31172B
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2503-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31172
GENERAL PURPOSE RELAY (2)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE GENERAL PURPOSE
RELAYS. IOA RECOMMENDS DELETING FMEA 2503-3, BECAUSE ITS FAILURE
MODE (SHORTS TO GROUND) IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE FOR THESE
COMPONENTS. NASA INCORPORATED 2503-3 INTO 2503-1.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-245
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31173
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2550-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31173
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (2), 3 AMPS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE RPC'S FOR A LOSS OF
OUTPUT FAILURE MODE.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-246
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31173A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2550-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31173
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (2), 3 AMPS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE RPC'S, IOA
RECOMMENDS DELETING FMEA 2550-2, BECAUSE ITS FAILURE MODE (SHORTS
TO GROUND) IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE FOR THE RPC'S. : NASA
INCORPORATED 2550-2 INTO 2550-1.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31174
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2550-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31174
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (2), 3 AMPS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMP_ [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION FOR THE REDUNDANT SHUTOFF
VALVE RPC 'S.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-248
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31175
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2575-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
EPD&C
31175
PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLER (6)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION FOR THE PIC'S WITH THE FAILURE
MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-249
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31176
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2575-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31176
PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLER (6)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION FOR THE PIC'S WITH THE FAILURE
MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31177
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2576-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31177
PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLER (2)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[x]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE PIC'S.
ix]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-251
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31178
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2576-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31178
PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLER (2)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE PIC'S FOR THE
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT. NASA TRANSFERRED FMEA TO
ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-252
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31183
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2578-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31183
ITEM: DIODE, 12 AMP
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_ [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING THE ISOLATION DIODE TO NASA'S CIL. THE
DIODE ISOLATES THE K6 & K7 ARM RELAYS FROM THE K8 DOWN RELAYS;
DIODE IS ALSO IN THE CIRCUIT SUPPLYING POWER TO THE LDG GEAR
CONTROL VALVE AND THE LDG GEAR DUMP CONTROL VALVE. POSSIBLE LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF LOSS OF POWER TO OPERATE THESE VALVES
IF THE DIODE FAILS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-253
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31184
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2578-2
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDACID: 31184
ITEM: DIODE, 12 AMP
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA FMEA EVALUATION FOR THE ISOLATION DIODE
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS, LOW RESISTANCE.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-254
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31185
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2580-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31185
ITEM: DIODE, 12 AMP
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA EVALUATION FOR THE TRANSIENT
SUPPRESSION DIODE FAILURE MODES: FAILS OPENS, FAILS TO CONDUCT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31185A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2580-2
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDACID: 31185
ITEM: DIODE, 12 AMP
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA EVALUATION FOR THE TRANSIENT
SUPPRESSION DIODE FAILURE MODES: FAILS OPENS, FAILS TO CONDUCT.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-256
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31213
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BB-2096-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31213
GENERALPURPOSERELAY, NONLATCHING(2)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF FMEA 2096-1 FOR THE
GENERAL PURPOSE RELAYS.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31213A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BB-2096-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31213
GENERAL PURPOSE RELAY, NONLATCHING (2)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT FMEA 2096-2 BE DELETED, BECAUSE IT IS A NON-
CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE (SHORTS TO GROUND) FOR THE NONLATCHING
RELAYS. NASA INCORPORATED FMEA 2096-2 INTO 2096-3.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31214
NASA FMEA # : 05-6BB-2096-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31214
GENERAL PURPOSE RELAY, NONLATCHING (2)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE GENERAL PURPOSE RELAYS
FOR THE FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-259
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31215
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BB-2101-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31215
BLOCKING DIODES (9), 3 AMP
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE BLOCKING DIODES IN THE
ANTI-SKID FAIL LIGHT/CONTROL CIRCUIT.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-260
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31211
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BB-2102-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31211
BLOCKING DIODE (4), 12 AMP
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE BLOCKING DIODES.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31212
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BB-2102-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31212
BLOCKING DIODE (4), 12 AMP
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT'.
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/IR] [P]
[3/3 ] [ ]
IF] [P]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[X]*
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION.
[x]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-262
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31222
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BB-2106-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31222
ITEM: TOGGLE SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION FOR THE BRAKE CONTROL
CIRCUIT TOGGLE SWITCHES FOR MAINS A, B, AND C
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-263
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31222A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BB-2106-2
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31222
ITEM: TOGGLE SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT FMEA 2106-2 BE DELETED, BECAUSE IT IS A NON-
CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE (SHORTS TO GROUND) FOR THE TOGGLE SWITCHES.
NASA INCORPORATED FMEA 2106-2 INTO 2106-1.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31223
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BB-2106-3
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31223
ITEM: TOGGLE SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION FOR THE BRAKE CONTROL
TOGGLE SWITCHES FOR MAINS A, B, AND C.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31225
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BB-2106-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31225
TOGGLE SWITCH, DPST
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ 3 [ 3
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE "MAIN C" TOGGLE
SWITCH AND IOA RECOMMENDS CHANGING THE CRITICALITY TO 3/3
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31220
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BB-2107-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31220
TOGGLE SWITCH, DPST
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF FMEA 2107-1 FOR THE
ANTI-SKID CONTROL CIRCUIT TOGGLE SWITCH.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31220A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BB-2107-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31220
TOGGLE SWITCH, DPST
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT FMEA 2107-2 BE DELETED, BECAUSE IT IS A NON-
CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE (SHORTS TO GROUND) FOR THE TOGGLE SWITCH.
NASA INCORPORATED FMEA 2107-2 INTO 2107-1.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31221
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BB-2107-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31221
TOGGLE SWITCH, DPST
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS C!L
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDS DOWN-
GRADING FMEA 2107-3 TO CRITICALITY 3/3.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31203
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BB-2111-I
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31203
ITEM: ANNUNCIATOR
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE ANTI-SKID FAIL LIGHT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31201
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BB-2240-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31201
GENERAL PURPOSE FUSE (8), 3 AMP
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE GENERAL PURPOSE
FUSE FOR THE "OPENS" FAILURE MODE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31205
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BB-2241-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31205
GENERAL PURPOSE FUSE (8) , 2 AMP
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR FULLY WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE GENERAL
PURPOSE FUSES. IOA RECOMMENDS: CHANGING THE REDUNANCY SCREENS
SINCE IT FAILS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B, AND DOWNGRADING FMEA TO A
3/1R..
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31204
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BB-2242-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31204
ITEM: FUSE, 1 AMP
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE FUSE IN THE BRAKE/SKID
CONTROL CIRCUITRY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31202
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BB-2246-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31202
ITEM: FUSE (5 AMP), 2
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
[ ]
COMPARE [N/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION.
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31206
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BB-2247-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31206
ISOLATION RESISTOR (3), 5.1K, 1/4 WATT
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE MDM ISOLATION RESISTORS
FOR THE BRAKE-SKID POWER/SWITCH SCAN MONITORING CIRCUITS.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31200
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BB-2248-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31200
ISOLATION RESISTOR, 5.1K, I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE ISOLATION RESISTOR.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31210
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BB-2249-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31210
CURRENT LIMITING RESISTOR (4), 1.21K, 2W
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ F ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR FULLY WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE RPC
CONTROL CIRCUIT CURRENT LIMITING RESISTORS. IOA RECOMMENDS (I)
CHANGING THE REDUNDANCY SCREENS (2) ADDING FMEA 2249-1 TO THE CIL
SINCE IT FAILS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31208
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BB-2249-2
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM :
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31208
CURRENT LIMITING RESISTOR (4), 1.21K, 2W
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA FMEA EVALUATION.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31209
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BB-2250-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31209
RESISTOR (4), 1.8K, I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S ANALYSIS OF THE RPC/MDM MONITOR CIRCUIT
BLEED-OFF RESISTORS.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-279
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31207
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BB-2253-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31207
ISOLATION RESISTOR (4), 2.2K, I/2W
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE MONITORING CIRCUIT
ISOLATION RESISTORS.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-280
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31226
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BB-2256-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31226
REMOTEPOWERCONTROLLER(4), i0 AMP
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE RPC'S THAT CONNECT OR
DISCONNECT MAIN DC BUS POWER TO THE ANTI-SKID CONTROL UNITS FOR
THE FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-281
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31227
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BB-2256-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31227
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (4), i0 AMP
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE RPC'S FOR THE
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-282
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31216
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BB-2262-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31216
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (3), TYPE 1
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE TYPE 1 HDC'S.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-283
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31218
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BB-2262-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31218
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE 3)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE TYPE 3 HDC FOR THE
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-284
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31217
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BB-2262-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
EPD&C
31217
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (3), TYPE 1
G. BEAIRD
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE TYPE 1 HDC'S FOR
THE FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-285
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31219
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BB-2262-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31219
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE 3)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE TYPE 3 HDC FOR THE
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-286
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/22/88
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31240X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BB-2270-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MEASUREMENT
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
31240
RESISTOR (I OHM)(2W) ANTI-SKID VLV COIL CURRENT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL EVALUATION
[ X ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-287
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31102
NASA FMEA #: 06-6BA-2118-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31102
PROXIMITY SENSOR BOX (2)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE PROXIMITY SENSOR BOXES
FOR THE FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-288
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31103
NASA FMEA #: 06-6BA-2200-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31103
ISOLATION DIODE (3), 1 AMP
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE ISOLATION DIODES.
OF DIODE FUNCTION NOT CRITICAL TO MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-289
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31103A
NASA FMEA #: 06-6BA-2200-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31103
ISOLATION DIODE (3), 1 AMP
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE ISOLATION DIODES.
OF DIODE FUNCTION NOT CRITICAL TO MISSION CREW VEHICLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-290
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31104
NASA FMEA #: 06-6BA-2201-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31104
ISOLATION DIODE (3), 1 AMP
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION, LOSS OF DIODE FUNCTION NOT
CRITICAL TO MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-291
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31104A
NASA FMEA #: 06-6BA-2201-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31104
ISOLATION DIODE (3), 1 AMP
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S EVALUATION, LOSS OF DIODE FUNCTION NOT
CRITICAL TO MISSION CREW VEHICLE.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-292
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
LDGDEC-10210
NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
i0210
STEERING DISCONNECT LOCK
W. WEISSINGER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
C
[ ]
[ NA]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NOT CONSIDERED BY THE NASA FMEA/CIL
[ ]
IX]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-293
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
LDGDEC-10212
NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10212
NOSE WHEEL RETAINING BOLT
W. WEISSINGER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
C
[ ]
[ NA]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ADDITIONAL DATA UNCOVERED AFTER STUDY COMPLETION ELIMINATES
THIS IOA EVALUATION REPORT
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-294
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
LDGDEC-10213
NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10213
AXLE
W. WEISSINGER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN]
C
[ ]
[ NA]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NOT EVALUATED BY NASA
[ ]
[x]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-295
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-10220
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10220
TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THE WORST CASE SCENARIO FOR A BROKEN TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY
WOULD BE A FAILURE THAT WOULD PREVENT THE NLG FROM LOCKING IN THE
EXTENDED POSITION. SIMILAR TO MLG TORQUE TUBE ASSY REF 02-1-010-
i.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-296
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-10401
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
10401
NLG EXTEND/ RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THERE IS NO NASA FMEA COVERING THIS FAILURE.
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-297
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
LDGDEC-10601
NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10601
NLG DOOR OVER-CENTER BUNGEE
J. COMPTON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
C
[ ]
[ NA]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS :
[ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-298
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-II004
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
11004
NLG UPLOCK ACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
GEAR WILL NOT RELEASE HYDRAULICALLY. THE PYRO BACKUP WILL
RELEASE THE GEAR ONE SECOND AFTER THE COMMAND TO DEPLOY IF THE
LANDING GEAR HOOK IS NOT OPEN.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-299
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-II302
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
11302
NLG DOOR BUNGEE ASSIST ASSY
LEAD ANALYST: W.WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
BUNGEE COULD POSSIBLY INADVERTENTLY RELEASE CAUSING THE NLG
DOOR TO CRACK OPEN.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-300
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-20205
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20205
AXLE KIT - MLG
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ NA]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS :
[ A ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-301
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-20214
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
20214
WEIGHT ON WHEELSSENSOR- MLG
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-302
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-20215
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
20215
WEIGHT ON WHEELSSENSOR- MLG
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
C
[ ]
[ NA]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-303
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-20401
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
20401
MLG EXTEND/ RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THERE IS NO NASA FMEA COVERING THIS FAILURE.
[ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-304
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-20601
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
20601
DOOROVER-CENTERBUNGEE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-305
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-21004
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
21004
MLG UPLOCKACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
GEAR WILL NOT RELEASE HYDRAULICALLY. THE PYRO BACKUP WILL
RELEASE THE GEAR ONE SECOND AFTER THE COMMAND TO DEPLOY IF THE
LANDING GEAR HOOK IS NOT OPEN.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-306
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-30104
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
30104
BRAKE PEDAL TRANSDUCER
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CLOSED LVDT WILL RESULT IN HALF-WHEEL LOCKUP ON LANDING WITH
ANTISKID OFF, CAUSING POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE. ANTISKID WILL
PROVIDE PROTECTION IF ON.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-307
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-30127
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
30127
TRANSDUCERS, SENSORS (INSTRUMENTATION)
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
r ]k
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-308
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31161
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31161
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE i)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING THE UNCOVERED TYPE 1 HDC TO NASA'S
FMEA/CIL. THE HDC CONNECTS MAIN BUS DC POWER TO THE "WOW2"
CIRCUITS WITHIN BRAKE/SKID CONTROL BOX A.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-309
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31162
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31162
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER(TYPE I)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] *
] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING THE UNCOVERED TYPE 1 HDC TO NASA'S FMEA
LIST. THE HDC CONNECTS MAIN BUS DC POWER TO THE "WOW2" CIRCUITS
WITHIN BRAKE/SKID CONTROL BOX A.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-310
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31167
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31167
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER(TYPE i)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING THE UNCOVERED TYPE 1 HDC'S TO NASA'S
FMEA/CIL. THE HDC'S POWER LEFT/RIGHT MAIN GEAR EVENT INDICATORS
DS3 AND DS2.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-311
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31179
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31179
ANNUNCIATOR LIGHT (4)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING THE ANNUNCIATOR LIGHTS TO NASA'S FMEA LIST.
THE ANNUNCIATOR LIGHTS PROVIDE VISUAL MONITORING OF THE LANDING
GEAR "ARM" AND "DOWN" PUSH BUTTON CIRCUITS.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-312
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31180
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31180
ANNUNCIATOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY (2)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING THE ANNUNCIATOR CONTROL ASSEMBLIES TO
NASA'S FMEA LIST. THE ANNUNCIATOR ASSEMBLIES PROVIDE POWER TO
THE LANDING GEAR "ARM" AND "DOWN" LIGHTS.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-313
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31182
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NO'S 1 & 2
EPD&C
31182
NOSE LANDING GEAR BRAKE UPLOCK RELEASE CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]*
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA HAS DONE AN ANALYSIS OF THE NOSE LANDING GEAR BRAKE UPLOCK
RELEASE CIRCUITS 1 & 2 TO PROVIDE CONSISTENT COVERAGE OF THE
SHUTTLE LANDING GEAR BRAKE UPLOCK RELEASE CIRCUITRY (SEE NASA
FMEA 200200-1). IOA AND NASA HAVE ALREADY COVERED THESE
COMPONENTS IN THEIR OWN FMEA ANALYSIS. NASA FMEA 200200-1 IS
DELETED, IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FMEA SHOULD NOT BE ADDED TO
NASA'S FMEA LIST.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-314
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31228
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31228
TOGGLE SWITCH (3)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING THE TOGGLE SWITCHES (FAILURE MODE: FAILS
CLOSED) TO NASA'S FMEA LIST. THE TOGGLE SWITCHES PROVIDE MANUAL
SWITCHING FOR DC POWER TO THE BREAK HYDRAULIC LINE HEATERS.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-315
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31229
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
EPD&C
31229
TOGGLE SWITCH (3)
G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING THE TOGGLE SWITCHES (FAILURE MODE: FAILS
OPEN) TO NASA'S FMEA LIST. THE TOGGLE SWITCHES PROVIDE MANUAL
SWITCHING FOR DC POWER TO THE BREAK HYRAULIC LINE HEATERS.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-316
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31230
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31230
CURRENT LIMITING RESISTOR (3), 1.21K, 2W
LEAD ANALYST : G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING THE CURRENT LIMITING RESISTORS (FAILURE
MODE: ELEMENT OPENS) TO NASA'S FMEA LIST. THE RESISTORS LIMIT
CURRENT TO THE RPC CONTROL CIRCUITS IN THE BRAKE HYDRAULIC LINE
HEATERS.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-317
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31231
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31231
CURRENTLIMITING RESISTOR (3), 1.21K, 2W
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
CIL
ITEM
C ] C ] C ] *
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING THE CURRENT LIMITING RESISTORS (FAILURE
MODE: SHORTS) TO NASA'S FMEA LIST. THE RESISTORS LIMIT CURRENT
TO THE RPC CONTROL CIRCUITS IN THE BRAKE HYRAULIC LINE HEATERS.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-318
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31232
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31232
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (3), i0 AMP
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING THE RPC'S (FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT) TO
NASA'S FMEA LIST. THE RPC'S CONNECT OR DISCONNECT DC BUS POWER
TO THE HYDRAULIC BRAKE HEATER COILS.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-319
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31233
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31233
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (3), i0 AMP
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING THE RPC'S (FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT
OUTPUT) TO NASA'S FMEA LIST. THE RPC'S CONNECT OR DISCONNECT DC
BUS POWER TO THE HYDRAULIC BRAKE HEATER COILS.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-320
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
LDGDEC-31234 BASELINE [
NONE NEW [
EPD&C
31234
ISOLATION RESISTOR (3), 5.1K, I/4W
G. BEAIRD
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING THE ISOLATION RESISTORS (FAILURE MODE:
ELEMENT OPENS, SHORTS) TO NASA'S FMEA LIST. THE RESISTORS
RESTRICT CURRENT BETWEEN HEATER CONTROL CIRCUITS AND MDM
MONITORING CIRCUITS.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-321
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31235
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31235
ANNUNCIATORCONTROLASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
3 [ ] *
] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING THE ANNUNCIATOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY (FAILURE
MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT) TO NASA'S FMEA LIST. THE ASSEMBLY PROVIDES
POWER TO THE ANTI-SKID FAIL ANNUNCIATOR LIGHT.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-322
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31237
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31237
SIGNAL CONDITIONER
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING THE SIGNAL CONDITIONER (FAILURE MODE: LOSS
OF OUTPUT, INADVERTENT OUTPUT) TO NASA'S FMEA LIST. THE SIGNAL
CONDITIONER PROVIDES VOLTAGE REDUCTION AND MDM-OFI MONITORING TO
BRAKE/SKID CONTROL BOX A.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-323
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31239
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31239
SIGNAL CONDITIONER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING THE SIGNAL CONDITIONER (FAILURE MODE: LOSS
OF OUTPUT, INADVERTENT OUTPUT) TO NASA'S FMEA LIST. THE SIGNAL
CONDITIONER PROVIDES VOLTAGE REDUCTION AND MDM-OF2 MONITORING TO
BRAKE/SKID CONTROL BOX B.
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 C-324
APPENDIX D
CRITICAL ITEMS
D-I
APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
NASA FMEA MDAC-ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
02-1-001-1
02-1-001-2
02-1-001-2
02-1-002-1
02-1-003-1
02-1-003-1
02-1-003-1
02-1-003-1
02-1-003-1
02-1-004-1
02-1-005-1
02-1-005-1
02-1-006-1
02-1-008-1
02-1-008-1
02-1-010-1
02-1-012-1
02-1-012-1
02-1-012-1
02-1-013-1
02-1-013-1
02-1-013-1
02-1-014-1
02-1-014-1
02-1-014-1
02-1-015-1
02-1-015-2
02-1-017-1
02-1-018-1
02-1-019-1
02-1-019-1
02-1-019-1
02-1-020-1
02-1-020-1
02-1-020-1
02-1-021-1
02-1-021-1
02-1-021-1
02-1-023-2
02-1-023-3
02-1-024-1
02-1-025-1
02-1-025-2
02-1-026-2
02-1-027-1
02-1-027-2
20201
20202
20203
20101
20206
20207
20219
20220
20221
20204
20208
20222
20216
20209
20210
20217
20501
20701
20901
20501
20701
20901
20501
20701
20901
21101
21102
20218
20223
20501
20701
20901
20501
20701
20901
20501
20701
20901
30117
30118
30101
30106
30105
30107
30109
30109
SHOCK STRUT STRUCTURE
SHOCK STRUT PISTON
SHOCK STRUT PISTON
TIRES, MLG TYPE I
LOWER DRAG BRACE STRU
UPPER DRAG BRACE TRUN
UPPER DRAG BRACE STRU
CENTER DRAG BRACE TRU
LOWER DRAG BRACE TRUN
TORQUE ARM ASSEMBLY
LOCK BRACE ASSEMBLY
LOCK BRACE CENTER TRU
UPLOCK ROLLER RETAINI
DOWN LOCK BUNGEE
DOWN LOCK BUNGEE
TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY
DOOR EXTEND / RETRACT
MLG UPLOCK HOOK ASSEM
DOOR HOOK ACTUATUON
DOOR EXTEND / RETRACT
MLG UPLOCK HOOK ASSEM
DOOR HOOK ACTUATUON
DOOR EXTEND / RETRACT
MLG UPLOCK HOOK ASSEM
DOOR HOOK ACTUATUON
MLG PYRO UPLOCK RELEA
MLG PYRO UPLOCK RELEA
SHOCK STRUT ATTACHING
SUPPORT BEAM
DOOR EXTEND / RETRACT
MLG UPLOCK HOOK ASSEM
DOOR HOOK ACTUATUON
DOOR EXTEND / RETRACT
MLG UPLOCK HOOK ASSEM
DOOR HOOK ACTUATUON
DOOR EXTEND / RETRACT
MLG UPLOCK HOOK ASSEM
DOOR HOOK ACTUATUON
SELECTOR VALVE
SELECTOR VALVE
ANTI-SKID SELECT SW
BRAKE CIRCUIT
BRAKE CIRCUIT
SKID CIRCUIT
ANTI-SKID FAIL CIRCUIT
ANTI-SKID FAIL CIRCUIT
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
INTERNAL / EXTERN
INTERNAL / EXTERN
RUPTURE
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
PHYSICAL BINDING
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
INADVERTANT FIRIN
FAIL TO FIRE
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAI LUR
STRUCTURAL FAI LUR
LEAKAGE
JAMMED CLOSED
SWITCH MALFUNCTIO
OPEN OR SHORT CIR
OPEN OR SHORT CIR
OPEN OR SHORT CIR
OPEN OR SHORT CIR
OPEN OR SHORT CIR
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NASA FMEA MDAC-ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
02-1-028-2
02-1-029-2
02-1-030-1
02-1-030-1
02-1-032-2
02-1-033-2
02-1-033-2
02-1-034-1
02-1-044-1
02-1-044-1
02-1-050-1
02-1-051-1
02-1-051-2
02-1-053-1
02-1-066-2
02-1-075-1
02-1-075-1
02-1-076-1
02-1-077-1
02-1-077-1
02-1-077-1
02-1-077-1
02-1-077-1
02-1-077-1
02-1-078-1
02-1-079-1
02-1-079-1
02-1-080-1
02-1-082-1
02-1-082-1
02-1-083-1
02-1-085-1
02-1-097-1
02-1-097-2
02-1-098-1
02-1-098-1
02-1-099-1
02-1-099-1
02-1-102-1
02-1-104-1
02-1-104-2
02-1-109-1
02-1-110-1
02-6-G08-A01
02-6-GOB-A02
02-6-G09-A01
02-6-G09-A02
02-6-G09-A04
02-6-G09-B02
02-6-G09-F01
30121
30131
30112
30130
30102
30111
30129
21301
30125
30126
30123
30123
30123
30123
30124
10215
10216
10211
10202
10203
10221
10222
10223
10224
10204
10205
10206
10214
10217
10701
10217
10209
11102
iii01
10501
10901
10501
10901
11301
11202
11201
10201
i0101
21005
21003
20404
20402
20416
20413
20414
BRAKE/ SKID CONTROL
BY - PASS VALVE, HYD
INLET FILTER, HYD MOD
INLET FILTER, HYD MOD
BRAKE PEDAL TRANSDUCE
HYD PRESS REG (SYS 2
HYD PRESS REG (SYS i)
MLG DOOR BOOSTER BUNG
RUDDER / BRAKE PEDAL
RUDDER / BRAKE PEDAL
EXCITER RING - WHEEL
EXCITER RING - WHEEL
EXCITER RING - WHEEL
EXCITER RING - WHEEL
STATORS, ROTORS, CLIP
SHOCK STRUT
SHOCK STRUT
TORQUE ARM ASSEMBLY
DRAG BRACE
DRAG BRACE TRUNION
DRAG BRACE
DRAG BRACE TRUNION
DRAG BRACE TRUNION
SUPPORT BEAM
LOCK BRACE ASSEMBLY
DOWNLOCK BUNGEE
DOWNLOCK BUNGEE
WEIGHT ON WHEELS SENS
UPLOCK ROLLER RETAINI
NLG UPLOCK HOOK ASSEM
UPLOCK ROLLER RETAINI
STEERING COLLAR ASSEM
NLG B/U PYRO UPLOCK
NLG B/U PYRO UPLOCK
NLG DOOR EXTEND / RET
NLG DOOR HOOK ACT LIN
NLG DOOR EXTEND / RET
NLG DOOR HOOK ACT LIN
NLG DOOR BUNGEE ASSIS
NLG EXTENSION BOOSTER
NLG EXTENSION BOOSTER
NOSE LANDING GEAR TRU
TIRES, NLG TYPE II
MLG UPLOCK ACTUATOR
MLG UPLOCK ACTUATOR
MLG EXTEND / RETRACT
MLG EXTEND / RETRACT
MLG EXTEND / RETRACT
MLG EXTEND / RETRACT
MLG EXTEND / RETRACT
JAMMED OPEN
FAILS TO OPEN
CLOGGED FILTER
FILTER CLOGGED
NO TRANSDUCER DEF
FAILS CLOSED
FAILS CLOSED
FAILS TO FUNCTION
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
BINDING / JAMMING
SHORT OR NO INPUT
SHORT OR NO INPUT
SHORT OR NO INPUT
SHORT OR NO INPUT
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
INTERNAL / EXTERN
INTERNAL / EXTERN
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
PHYSICAL BINDING
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
ERONEOUS OUTPUT
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
FAIL TO FIRE
INADVERTANT FIRIN
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
FAIL TO FIRE
INADVERTANT FIRIN
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
RUPTURE
RUPTURE
LEAK EXTERNAL
RUPTURE
LEAK, EXTERNAL
TEMPERATURE TRANS
SHUTTLE VALVE
TIMING ORIFICE
D-3
NASA FMEA MDAC-ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
02-6-H01-A01
02-6-H01-A02
02-6-H01-A04
02-6-H01-B02
02-6-H01-F01
02-6-H03-1
02-6-H03-2
05-6BA-200200-I
05-6BA-2115-I
05-6BA-2117-I
05-6BA-2118-4
05-6BA-2206-I
05-6BA-2207-I
05-6BA-2244-2
05-6BA-2300-I
05-6BA-2301-I
05-6BA-2302-I
05-6BA-2303-I
05-6BA-2356-I
05-6BA-2401-3
05-6BA-2402-3
05-6BA-2407-I
05-6BA-2407-2
05-6BA-2408-I
05-6BA-2409-I
05-6BA-2410-I
05-6BA-2410-2
05-6BA-2413-I
05-6BA-2413-2
05-6BA-2415-I
05-6BA-2415-2
05-6BA-2501-I
05-6BA-2502-I
05-6BA-2502-3
05-6BA-2576-I
05-6BA-2578-I
05-6BB-2096-I
05-6BB-2096-2
05-6BB-2096-3
05-6BB-2102-2
05-6BB-2107-I
05-6BB-2107-2
05-6BB-2240-I
05-6BB-2241-I
05-6BB-2246-I
05-6BB-2249-I
05-6BB-2262-I
05-6BB-2262-2
05-6BB-2270-I
NONE
NONE
10404
10402
10416
10413
10414
11005
11003
31166
31113
31117
31101
31107
31109
31123
31126
31127
31125
31137
31128
31149
31144
31158
31158
31156
31154
31159
31160
31152
31153
31150
31151
31168
31170
31171
31177
31183
31213
31213
31214
31212
31220
31220
31201
31205
31202
31210
31216
31217
31240
10210
10212
NLG EXTEND / RETRACT
NLG EXTEND / RETRACT
NLG EXTEND / RETRACT
NLG EXTEND / RETRACT
NLG EXTEND / RETRACT
NLG UPLOCK ACTUATOR
NLG UPLOCK ACTUATOR
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROL
PUSHBUTTON SWITCH (2)
PUSHBUTTON SWITCH, LD
PROXIMITY SENSOR BOX
BLOCKING DIODE (2) 12
BLOCKING DIODE (2) 12
CIRCUIT BREAKER (3 AM
GENERAL PURPOSE FUSE
GENERAL PURPOSE FUSE
GENERAL PURPOSE FUSE
GENERAL PURPOSE FUSE
RESISTOR (12)
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROL
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROL
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROL
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROL
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROL
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROL
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROL
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROL
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROL
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROL
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROL
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROL
LATCHING RELAY (6)
LATCHING RELAY (6)
LATCHING RELAY (6)
PYRO INITIATOR CNTRL
DIODE, 12 AMP
GENERAL PURPOSE RELAY
GENERAL PURPOSE RELAY
GENERAL PURPOSE RELAY
BLOCKING DIODE (4)
TOGGLE SWITCH, DPST
TOGGLE SWITCH, DPST
GENERAL PURPOSE FUSE
GENERAL PURPOSE FUSE
FUSE (5 AMP), 2
CURRENT LIMITING RESI
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROL
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROL
RESISTOR (I OHM)(2W)
STEERING DISCONNECT
NOSE WHEEL RETAINING
RUPTURE
LEAK, EXTERNAL
TEMPERATURE TRANS
SHUTTLE VALVE
TIMING ORIFICE
RUPTURE
LEAK EXTERNAL
INADVERTENT OUTPU
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
INADVERTENT OUTPU
ELEMENT OPENS
ELEMENT OPENS
FAILS OPEN
OPENS, PREMATURE
OPENS, PREMATURE
OPENS, PREMATURE
OPENS, PREMATURE
ELEMENT OPENS
INADVERTENT OUTPU
INADVERTENT OUTPU
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
INADVERTENT OUTPU
LOSS OF OUTPUT
INADVERTENT OUTPU
LOSS OF OUTPUT
INADVERTENT OUTPU
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS CLOSED
LOSS OF OUTPUT
ELEMENT OPENS
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS CLOSED
SHORTS
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
OPENS, PREMATURE
OPENS, PREMATURE
OPENS, PREMATURE
ELEMENT OPENS
LOSS OF OUTPUT
INADVERTENT OUTPU
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
CORROSION, STRUCT
D-4
NASA FMEA MDAC-ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
NONE
NONE
NONE
NONE
NONE
NONE
NONE
NONE
NONE
NONE
NONE
NONE
NONE
NONE
NONE
10213
10220
10401
10601
11004
11302
20205
20214
20215
20401
20601
21004
30104
30127
31161
AXLE
TORQUETUBE ASSEMBLY
NLG EXTEND/ RETRACT
NLG DOOR OVER-CENTER
NLG UPLOCK ACTUATOR
NLG DOOR BUNGEE ASSIS
AXLE KIT - MLG
WEIGHT ON WHEELS SENS
WEIGHT ON WHEELS SENS
MLG EXTEND / RETRACT
DOOR OVER-CENTER BUNG
MLG UPLOCK ACTUATOR
BRAKE PEDAL TRANSDUCE
TRANSDUCERS, SENSORS
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROL
CORROSION, STRUCT
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
BROKEN ROD / LINK
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
BROKEN ROD / LINK
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
SHORTED OPEN
SHORTED CLOSED
BROKEN ROD / LINK
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
BROKEN ROD / LINK
SHORT / CLOSED
FAILURE - NO DATA
LOSS OF OUTPUT
D-5

APPENDIX E
DETAILED ANALYSIS
This appendix contains the IOA analysis worksheets supplementing
previous results reported in STSEOS Working Paper 1.0-WP-VA86001-
25, Analysis of the Landing/Deceleration Subsystem, (19 January
1987). Prior results were obtained independently and documented
before starting the FMEA/CIL assessment activity. Supplemental
analysis was performed to address failure modes not previously
considered by the IOA. Each sheet identifies the hardware item
being analyzed, parent assembly and function performed. For each
failure mode possible causes are identified, and hardware and
functional criticality for each mission phase are determined as
described in NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation of FMEA and
CIL, I0 October 1986. Failure mode effects are described at the
bottom of each sheet and worst case criticality is identified at
the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
E-I
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/22/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
31240 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
MEASUREMENT
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR (i OHM) (2W) ANTI-SKID VLV COIL CURRENT
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
BRAKE AND ANTI-SKID
FWD LCA-I,2,3
RESISTOR (i OHM)(2W) CURRENT SENSORS (4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ P ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V51A2
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF ANTI-SKID PROTECTION DUE TO LOCKED WHEEL/BRAKE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/15/88 E-2
APPENDIX F
NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS
This section provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and
corresponding IOA analysis worksheet(s) included in Appendix E.
The Appendix F identifies: NASA FMEA Number, IOA Assessment
Number, NASA criticality and redundancy screen data, and IOA
recommendations.
Appendix F Legend
Code Definition
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
,
8.
9.
I0.
Ii.
12.
13.
IOA recommends downgrading the criticality.
IOA recommends upgrading the criticality.
IOA recommends changing the effects field.
IOA concurs with NASA's evaluation of the FMEA.
IOA generated a non-credible failure mode.
IOA recommends that the FMEA be deleted because it is
not a credible failure for that particular component or
components.
IOA recommends changing NASA's redundancy screen fields
to conform to NSTS 22206
IOA recommends generating a new FMEA for an uncovered
component and/or failure mode.
IOA recommends combining FMEA's together that are
criticality 3, to conform to NSTS 22206.
NASA's FMEA/CIL revaluation deleted this failure mode
as a non-credible failure.
IOA recommends deletion of this item from the CIL.
IOA recommends the addition of this item to the CIL
listing.
NASA transferred the FMEA/CIL to another subsystem.
F-I
_L PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
_F :,%'_,, F
!==_:T_-I_F= ',; 10A R-.uMM:Nr..,LO.% !
....... OA 'ISSUEJJ,.:_, _ , ;; C:RIT : ........e ,, SCREEP4S_K_'t,,_ CRIT I ', OTHER , [
F_EA ,_"M_po .................. HW.'F .... C........ c-_," E..O,:.E:,.,....... i .:=E=SM=,,, t'._BEr, ;; A B C ,, '_W,.r..... , A B : ,,=:: uc=r.._# !
:::::::::::::::::::::::i ................... I
02-I-O{a-i
if,2-I-:}07-[
02- 1-008-I
, ' '2- 1-00'7-1
Q 3 - i -(w _ i'; -
02-1 '....
02-I-C43-1
02-1-014-I
02-!-0'.5-;
02-t -c15-2
02-i-017-!
02-I-018-i
02-i-01o-i
'>2- : -(:2('- :
';'2- ;-0_:! -"
02-!-022-i
02-!-022-2
02-I-02_-1
02-i-023-2
L_S_EC-202::I;
LD]DE_-232::2
L?.GDEC-202O,_
G,GDEC-2010;
LDGDEC-20219
LDGDEC-20220
LDGDEC-2022!
LDGDEC-20204
LI_GDEC-2020P
LDGDEC-20222
LDGI}EC-202'.,
w&'L_LH" _- z ,.z l
LDBDEC-20209
LDGOEC-20210
LDGDEC-20212
LDGDEC-2¢,2[
LDBOEC-20217
-DGDEC-20501
LDBDEC-20701
LDGDEC-20901
LDBDEC-20501A
r_ r. -"1 ,'tr * m
LDGDEC-20901A
LDGDEC-205018
LDBDEC-20701B
L.',GDEC-20?O!B
LDGr,EC-21_O_
LD@DEC-21102
' LDGi)EC-2022_
LDGr,EC-20501C
L:,GDE_,-2070iC
LD_DEC-20701C
t ,_ _.'-,- ",.'L_'r'}* r I
L2_DEC-2070'.D
LDG_EC-2050;E
LDGDEC-207OIE
LDGDEC-20_O!E
LDGDEC-301I:
_r._rm _'141 m
LDG[],EC-30117
;; 3/3 )4A
I; :/! NA
;_ 11! NA
' _"_ NA
,' 1.;t NA
_,t NA
i ';_ NA
" ' ;_ NA
1_I ,_A
'./t NA
i/t N_
_,:3 NA
z,t
_,,.iR P !_A
_IIR P ,_A
,,;_ ,NA
3,"_ NA NA
I/I NA NA
i!t NA NA
I/i NA NA
i/1 NA NA
l, i NA t4A
; ', t,"i N_ "^t'IM
',I ;/I NA NA
I', 1/I t4A _IA
,, I 4. NA
l '_ [/i NA NA
,, 1/I NA NA
',', 2/IR NA N_
.... I _4ANA
',i £,;I NA NA
:', !,'l NA NA
;; [/I !iAt4A
' : "'I N_ NA
i,i NA NA
.3/IR P F
3/'.R P P
I/I NA NA
NA _A
NA NA
NA NA
_4ANA
NA N,_
_A NA
NA NA
NA N,4
_A NA
_IA_4A
NA NA
N& NA
P
P
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
WA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
_A
NA
NA
_4A
NA
NA
NA
NA
'4A
NA
_A
P
P
NA
,I
G/IR
i/I.
I/!
i/l
I/I
"!I
i/I
i
i
!/l
.
I!I
l,'!
l i
I /
I 2:tR
I
3/!R
S!3
]
I
tIANA NA
NA RA _A
NA _A NA
NA NA NA
NA MA _,IA
N_ N_ N_
NA NA NA
NA _A NA
N _I N
F- P P
NA NA NA
3.!:
4
8
B.12
8,12
B.12
4
4
2.8.!2
2,8.12
4
4
4
4
4
4
-1
4
,l
4
4
4'3
2.;.3
4
4
4
4
4
ff
4
4
4
L
4
F-2
ORICC'_AL pr,,'-,_',,,:_,._S
OF POOR QUALITY
,u,_ =,",.', i SCRED4S i: u.l, _ =_r,::_q= i ]THER
Fr,:_,.... _iU_E,p, ,......" ..:: c_, II;'_;PP,....... "............ " r _ 'S"E' "_:'" _,m:
...................... i ................... _ .................. 1 i __.:____== ] =_:-=_._--= =-_-_._-_-==_-=_=:=====-= _======
C.2-',. .......- U _ d - .J
) 2- i-!)-_5-2
}:-:-t/_& :
" 2-i-2 :-2
: :2H-(27-:
;,:-i'..... 027-2
02-1 '"_'_ '
-_J4o-,
02-!-(;:.S-2
,._ . -U-'C.-.J
02-/-02%2
02-[-(L'.(>2
)2-I-072-I
02-I-0_.2-2
02-L-05S-1
02-I-0J3-2
.-£- I -!.' .;if- L
02-[-044- 1
02-I-0_.0-I
02-i-05!-!
02-i-05!-2
02-1-05g-I
02-i-06_-2
.1:2-:-07_-1
;P_-,-076-i
6 '_ I ,'17"_
::'2- I -)9)- :
,_,9- } -rl _ ! -
r.... -,r,_ 1
)2-!-,.,8._- *
2,a- l -'..Od-i
: L:,GDEC-79:01
I L_._DEC-:01}_
: L_L_C,Eg-:(!I!)_
: L}GDEC--):(_
L:ECEC-S::IG7
l LDGg,Eg-::::O?
_ L}GDEC-_(>I.!gA
I LDGDEC-S0122
',LDGDEC-_OI21
LD3DEr-SO:20
-r_GDEC-/. a 1.,
LDGDEC-301_I
bouE_-_!, _
LDGDEC-3,S',!_O
LDGDEC-5:)IO:_
LDGDEC-36102
LD_DEC-_01£O
LP,SDEC-J0111
LDGDEC-_0129
LDGDEC-21_OI
LDGDEC-D125
LDGP_EC-_.O]2_
_DDDE3-:(:12:_
. LDGDEC-30!23B
LDGDE_2-30123C
LP,'GDEC-30124
! LDGDEC-I0215
LDBDEC-IO21a
LDGDEC....... "
'.LDGDEC-I02!)_'
LDGDE3-10221
L:_GP,.EC-10222
L_,GDEC-I022:,
LDGDEC,-I0224
i LD@EC-I0204
', LP,,_3DEC-! 02-_6
i L}GDEC-:Y214
I L.::_GDE[-iC.21S
; LDBP.EC-10219
I LDG,2EC-!02(_7
':LDGDEC-IO20B
I L£,G:EC-t0217
: LDGDEC-I0701
',LDGDEC-IO217A
; LDGDEC-!O20g
', L.!R _ ? : F....... ",, ;,J , !'_A,_I_ HA,
....... :' F F ' I'I " PiA ?tA
...... F' < :' :! _ 3 i NA NA NA
•?[_ ,
.J__R P
/ i I'_M
_/IR P
3/3 NA
._/_ NA
_/'.R F'
3/IR
:'/IR P
2,'IR ?
3'lF: F'
,'IF: F
J, ir, F'
I/l NA
1,"! NA
2/IR P
2/IR P
n. _H:) P
2/IR P
•b_ i,', F'
I/i NA
I/I NA
•.al i_, T
' ' [/! NA
_, i,!! NA
/i
' I/I NA
',: ',/1 ' NA
i "/I NA
?/i.,; J i _ P
; ,,..r, P
F
F
P
NA
N_
.p
0
P
P
P
P
NA
,NA
P
P
P
P
P
N_
P
NA
_;A
NA
t,4
t,lA
NA
L-'IR : P P P , :
1
4
_, _,_ _IA!_A_A
P /
NA /
P
NA /
N_ _ .....'it, F' F F
NA 2/IR P P P
F 2/IR P P P
2/!R P F F
P
P
P
P
P
NA
NA
P
P
P
r.
P
NA
NA
P
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
P
F
2/1R
2,"IR
/
/
/
373
S!:
',I S/_
)', 3!3
il I/I
(I /
lI I/1
I: !/I
',I I/I
i'. /
',I I/!
_I !/I
1) I/I
It !/'.
2
il
4
4
4
3.!2
2.L8, '"
.*.£
2.8.12
2.3.8.t2
4
4
, , £,_,14
P F P _'
4
4
4
NA NA NA ,..'i
"* NA,_. )iA I.II
k)?k
,,.NA N_ :.II
NA HA,!'}A _.'ii
,P P F' ,LI2
4
"_ )iA'_"I' M ; i'4M 22
a. ,_-I NA 8..
3.12
t_At;A,,.,...... :. 12
NA :'!A^.), S.I2
}!A)i_At( _,12
l
JIM _WM I_M • i
; J,'IR
; J,'IR
i JIIR
I_ 3.3
I; I!! NA
" I/i _NA
1. I HA
3/IR P
P )CAP :i _,_s
P '4 P l: _/:,
F' _IAP If 3/.3
NA !'IANA l; /
NA NA NA ',: /
NA NA ',', ,'
_:AHA 11 /
NA Nil :', I,"I
P P i', /
):
P P P , :
,P : P _.!
P P P !
4
4
4
4
4
F-3
C2-: -09_-I
-_ff _ C,r,r, .
(:2-I-102-1
02-I-104-:
02-i-!04-2
02-I-109-!
02-!-[10-[
02-_-gOS-A01
02-6-GOB-A02
02-6-GG_-AO_
02-3-G09-_0[
02-=-GOg-A02
02-_-GOg-AO_
, 02-O-GOg-A04
02-_-GC,9-80:
02-6-_09-B,t"2
02-6-G09-C01
OZ-_.-GOo-C,OI
02-o-GOg-D02
}2-c-S09-E01
02-_-GOg-E02
02-=-GOg-F?I
O2-_-GOB-GOi
02-6-_0£-H0!
02-6-007-H02
02-6-3C,_-J81
02-5-G09-C02
02-6-L_,:,9-KOI
02-6-G12-!
02-,_-.H01-A01
02-6-HO:-A02
02-6-H0!-AO
02-_-HO:-A04
C_2-'.-HO!-BOI
02-6-HOI-B02
0:-_-H0!-CC_t
02-_-!_>'.-:-}'.
)2-=-_.:. : -0.. 2
82-_-_,(:-EO
")2--:--r_0:--E02
02-_-40 ! -F,: l
02-6,-HOi-G,:1
?2-_-HOi-HOI
= O2-6-H?I-H02
02-6-_01-J01
02-6-HOI-J02
LDSDEC-I:i:;I
LDGDEC-!0501
LDGDEC-iOgcq
LDCOE[-!CSO!A
LDGDEC-i:)?O!A
LDGDEC-II:OI
LD_DEC-I!202
LDGDEC-I:201
LDGDEC-I0201
LDBDEC-I0!01
LDGDEC-21005
LDGDEC-21003
LDBDEC-2100_
L_BDEC-20404
LDGDEC-20402
LDGDEC-2040_
LDGDEC-2041_
LDGDEC-20412
LDGDEC-2041:
LDGDEC-20411
LDGDEC-20409
LDGDEC-20410
LDGDEC-2040_
LDBDEC-2040_A
LDGDEC-20414
LDGDEC-20406
LDBDEC-20415
LDGDEC-20415A
LDGDEC-20407
_u=D_L.-_040_
LDGDEC-20405
LDGDEC-_OI2B
LDBDEC-:0404
LDGDEC-!0402
LDGDEC-1041_
LDGDEC-10412
_oDEC-,_41_
LDGDEC-10411
LDGDEC-:O40B
LDGDEC-10_OBA
LDGDEC-10414
LDGDEC-!0406
LDSDEC-I04!5
LDSDEC-!O415A
LDGDEC-IO;O?
LDGDEC-!O407A
[ / |
i/t
1,1
1/;.
lxlt
!/I
2iIR
1/I
3:3
:/IR
;', '/I
i{ .,J
,", 3/:
I; :...iS
i': I/!
" 3,':
,_ .3/_
Q,J
i _ -J/Q
:I 1;'1
,," 313
_, °1',
'I [/I
QZ.:
', L'3 '
; 3/: ':
'_ 3/3 I
, .,[ i
,' _/ J I
]/3 ',
:/: I
i
NA rlANA
NA _A NA
NA NA _._A
M6 _z,
NA NA NA
N_ NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NP, N_
P P P
P P P
NA NA NA
NClNA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA HA
p p o
NQ NA NA
NA N_ NA
NA NA NA
_IANA NA
IIANA NA
NA NA NA
N_ _-_ANA
NA NA NA
NA NA _A
NA _4ANA
NA NA _A
NA NA NA
NA I,!A....
P P P
NA NA '4A
NA NA NA
NA "^
P P P
I,IA '"N. NA
NA NA ....!'IH
_q _:ANA
NA NA NA
I4_ "_ANA
NA NA r_A
!4A _'_ANA
NA NA _
NA NA !,IA
NA NA IIA
NA ,*lA NA
NA NA NA
/
!
j'
I,'i
f
/
/
L/I
/
i
Jr
/
',; 2/IR
_; 2/IR
FI /
I', /
::
'I
I
I
I
: 2/,R
,, ,,
2/IR
4
4
E
XA NP,HA :.!2
d
NA NA NA B.!2
4
F :
F 3.4
4
4
F F P 2.B,12
P F P :
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
P F P 2
, p c p , _
:4
4
4
, 4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
F-4
"'.'2,.-'? ;4 _,
OF POOR f_UALITY
:,,_H , _. '.,_ C :L,',._;'_,',CF:IT ', E_,=_.S ', 3THER I ISSL:E;
'-.... NU,".,E'.ER ............ ""'_ ...... W"
._u,,_=,- , _ .," . A B 2 ', (SEE ....... O':_
i .................. , ....... j t
====================== =--===-------'----;--==------= i ;
................... i ....... =======================================
}2-1-:4'}!-KC_I
C'2---.HO'-I
: 02-:-!!_,_o3
C__"-)5SA-24C:1-:
0,5-2i0_-'
05-2407-2
05-_BA-21!3-!
05-6BA-2!IS-!
v_-,bB,-=ItJ-_
.]5-6BA-2116-1
05-,_A-2116-2
0C-6BA-211_-_
::)5-_BA-2117-Z
05-6BA-2117-3
05-6BA-2204-!
: ._-..B_4-....L.4-._
', 05-_B_-2205-I
i 05-_E_A-220,5-2
V=J'60 h',;.._ !J _," 1
_ 05-_,BA-2206-2
05-6B#-220_-I
)5-6BA-22(.,9-I
05-6BA-220%2
05-6BA-224_-i
_5-6BA-2244-I
)5-6BA-22_4-2
.-= .a^ _.-_
,-5-_/>27)0-2
:}5-oBA-2_01-2
"5-6B_-2D2- !
05-OBA-2303-i
(;,5-,:BA-2_51-1
Oa--6B_4--_.'Ji--=
mr m_-m, , i ,_r:?
LDGDEC-;I!"3
L£,GDEC-3'.,I_4
LDGDEC-31165
LDGDEC-}!I6o
LOGDEC-_i!@!
LI)GDEC-;I!19
LU-"-'_'._-O : I i.J
LnGDE'C-3!i14A
LDODEC-;I!'"L?
LDGDEC-J.!!5
LuoL :" L-,._I. i d M
L L:G_,Z'- c4.1_'_I
L_GDEC-3{I17
LDGDEC-3|! O:
LD_,-_-,,,100
_D.o.,. oil....
LDGDEC-JII05
_.'_ t/t" b- C. i iOdH
rr, _ _..>._
LL"_'L,t" L_'Ol I l!_'_
LDBDEC-31!,2}9
L.nGDEC-3|IlO
cDGD_-c4 I_,
Lnr,n-'r--,;(??a
cD,,D_.-.:,Ilal
: r. r, r- -_ ,?,_.L"B_'E_-sli.;'
LDeDE.-oli_.
,[;. JH
, l-,,-_r_ -- nn^
. _ OL'_.b- j 1 i 6," H
cu_'.'cC-o_i.J
LI)GDEC-_11_7
LDGDEC-St! 37A
LDGDEC-311_O
m ,'-- ,I, *
,' 2/IR
' 2,'|R
; • L_IR
' ],/IR
NA NA NA
? ? P
N.4_'!ANA
NA "_:'_. l'iA
F' F F
p -. p .,
, L':I:_. F' P P
, ._/IR
,' 3/IR
, ; 3/IR
_I 1,5
3/|R
O/.3
/
i;l
J,J
2/IF;
3/IR
211R
2/IR
; ', .313
.j /
:I 3/1R
3!IR
/ .3
3/.3
v: i,,
'_,' 3/3
J .J
I', 3"F- : F' F P
; 3,=£_',F' F ;
I L<] :
2/IR : F' P P
' 2/tR ', P P F'
313 I
3/3 I
; 3/3 '.
I .'
r, F' 'P i /
P P P : I
P P P II /
p r F' Ii /
II /
F' P P ',t /
f
m_
_.'IR
2/|P;
II /
II ,r
F' F P II "'"
_fO
P P, P II ._,,,,,"[P
I,IA NA NA ,'I /
_:' p =, ,, .,_, : i .J,' J
F' P F' II /
,,, ,
/
F F _" 3,c3
P F P
P F P
P P P
P P P ,_
PF'P ;: ,
/
5"t_:
/
J
J
/
;4
P F P :_
P P P _.12
4
:4
',4
P F ? 4
4
6.10
_.I0
a.!O
F 6.10
4
4
5!0
4
5,1C
l.?,i!
F' F F' 1,7
6,I0
|.ll
4
4
4
!.!I
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5,1,>
5.!C.
F' F P 1,7
F
._.!0
4
4
_=_==_=_==_=_=_======_======_===_==_===_=_=====_=_======_==_==_=======_====_==_==_======_======_=====_==_
F-5
OF POOR QUALITY
05-6S_>2..'5_-:
C,C-6BA-;Z5.4-i
:5-6B_>2.'-5,_-2
_5-:S_-2:60-I
:)5-_BA-2;ei-i
05%BA-2_I-2
05-6BA-2_52-!
_}5-6BA-23O2-2
05-0BA-23_3-!
.?,5-_BA-2400-I
-,= pm _...n
05-_BA-2402-I
_}5-OB._-2402-2
05-6BA-2402-_
05-L-.BA-24(I:-2
0_-6BA-2¢0_-1
>5-6BA-2404-2
C,5-6BA-2404-]
05-6BA-2405-i
,)5-_BA-2405-2
05-_BA-2406-I
05-OBA-2_05-2
05-_BP,-240=-_.
05-6B#,-240?-i
05-_BA-2407-2
c."5-OBA-2407-3
05-oBA-2_08-I
05-6BA-240B-2
75-6BA-2409-I
05-_BA-2410-I
)5-_BA-24!3-2
-.,_-_:_-_4_..-._
>5-5BA-2¢15-2
{5-'_A-25'I:-T
_5-o.qA-2502-!
05-68A-2502-2
C:5-_BA-2=_02-3
05-_BA-2503-I
05-68A-2_0_-2
05-_BA-2503-_
_E_-_li_._
LDGDEC-31139A
_oDcu-oi1._i
LDGDEC-3114£
LOBDEC-31149
mmm 7_ _ fl
LDGDEC-_1142
LDBDEC-31142@
LDGDEC-31146A
LDGDEC-31145
LDGDEC-_II45A
LDGDEC-_!!5_
LDGDEC-_IISBA
LDGDEC-31156
LDGDEC-31157
LDSDEC-31154
LDGDEC-31!59
LDGDEC-31160
LD_DEC_....
Lnpnpr-_1,:_
LDGDEC-_I_=__
LDG_EC-_11[I
_,G_,_-_
LDGDEC-_II70
LDGDEC-_!!71
L_GDEC-31172B
i:/ .'3
,3/.3
.3_..,, .j
.3;,3 '
3/.3
3,'IR P F' P i
D'3 C
2/IR P P F i
3/iP.. P P P ':
.,.':R P P P '_
2/iR P' P :' '
3/_"
3/7
.3/.3!
_/3
3/3
3/!R , P P P
J/ J
3/]
I: 2,'IR
, _ ._,'_
,," 3/IR
-J/ ,J
:I 3,;IR
,:' .L_IR
'c 2/IR
.... IR
:i _,'1£
' ; _ "P F-' _r, -,
, =,IR P F P ',;
:: 2/'.R F P F' '_
_: 2/IR P P ? ',
,_ ,: F F F
:', _/IR P P P
I;
',I /
P P P II ,
P P P '_',/
:I /
P F F :',
P P P ::
O F P i:
P F P ',:
P F P ',',
P F ? ',':
:, : p ,',
P F P '.i
,.- : o ii
4
!
4
4
• 4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4,13
4,1,".
4
4
4
4
4,9
4,9
4,9
4,?
6
4,'?
4,9
I,':
4,?
6
4
4
6
4
4
7,12
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
0
4
F-6
7.................72:-272]................................................................
!-_L_ It"I:F,S ; i t_AS_ ' ' - ...................
...........................................i ..............'_ "_ .....;,,c:_u_.u;_! I
,,._ _ _ ................................................ !
,,CRIT ; SgREEN_ _' CR!T
....... , :_n,_" _ A B C II>_;#/F
...... :::=::::::::::=: i :::::::::-:::=:::::: I I :::---::::::::::::== ; I :=:::=:
,, o,,. i , P P :I /
P P P _:
p p c_
P ,_ p
P P P
F' _ P
P F P
P P P
i
/
:/,3
i
!
P F P
....... L.mGDEC-!04 :!
LC,G:ZZ:-2:}2':[
L}G[EC-ZO.!4
L L_,'L" L..- z %!z_ _,
, l_ m • ",ma-,_L_,,GuEr-_,.,.,,.,._
_Ool;:C--'Ub[,
LDGDEC-SO104
LDGDEC-_0127
LW_bC_-J_ 1._
L_GDEC-:_167
LDGI}EC-31179
LD'_DEC-3IIG2
_DG_'E_-_?
-I]G_'cC-_,_230
L_r,p_ _-,
L.u=uE'-:t=._
LDr:DEC-71233
LC'GDEC-312_4
, _n_rh !_n_QL _J,3L_EL. - _, 1 z j
,[
'i
I; 5/_ : NA NA NA
_ -Jz _ ; F:M NM I -",
2,"IR F' ; F'
i/ I NANA _A
....... NA ""
_4rl
I_ NA NA NA
31,3 NA NA NA
3/3 NA NA NA
/'p_,, P F P
t _ NA _'',, mNA
_"13 NA NA ?4A
,_ _,"IR P F F'
0 i -.,
' .3i_
: 3/_ '
, i 3/3
J; 3/1R F' F' P
3_,!R P ? P
3;3
3/IR P P P
3,:'3
, .j_ _,
4
".12
8.12
4.-
£.12
8.12
5
8
@
:8
6.!0
@
8
.p
8
B
B
J
X ;
):
F-8



8MCDONNELL DOUGLAS ASTRONAUTICS COMPANY-
ENGINEERING SERWCES
16055 SPACE CENTER BLVD, HOUSTON, TEXAS 77062
Independent Orbiter Assessment
Assessment of the Landing/Deceleration FMEA/CIL
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in_
1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of J
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items/
rect_n W_ giv_ _ the _'r--_-0r-Di_er and GFE
--__ct_ Office __£urm t_ hardware ai_aly_ic u_ing t-_-_
___i/1_truct _---_,,_and gPe_l_L_r111ez definzd _.._-"STS.. 2_206, Instructlons
for p__z_--ef-q_R_ _ .... 19__
The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Landing /
Deceleration (LDG/DEC) hardware, generating draft failure modes
and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this
analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results
contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation• The IOA
results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with
proposed Post 51-L updates included• A resolution of each
discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional
analysis as required. This report documents the results of that
comparison for the Orbiter LDG/DEC hardware.
The.IOA product for the LDG/DEC analysis consisted of 259 failure
mode Wworksheets _ that resulted in 124 potential critical items
being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline %_s-
-_--_%_J__J_ which consisted of 267 FMEA's and 120 CIL
• _f th _ were any _es-_t_ "_items T4_e-_km_ari_cn__etermincd ........
--. ...... by th_ _92_b "-_ w_ra nct in the w_A ba_c!in_.
This comparison p;oduced_agreement on all but 75 FMEA's which
caused difference{_in-5i CIL items.
o[ the proposed Pozt 5!-L N.._SA --_ _n .... c ICA
...... 2. ..... •_Teco_ended --- :-- =
The _ arose due t_m_ff_ences between the _A_A
FMEA/CIL p_paratio_nstructio _. NASA had/u_ed aAo!der _
rules docume_ w_h has since be_ super s_6ded by the_NST_Y22206 1
used by the IO/A_ After comp_e no dis/c_epanc%e s /
\ found that/w_re not already id_SA, an_/the_emaini _
",i_buted to _ces_i4% grou_rules. "_
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